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A Tale of Two Portlands: How Port Cities Can Survive 
Dormant Commerce Clause Challenges to Fossil Fuel Shipping 
Restrictions 
Kayla Race, J.D. Candidate, 2020 
 
Abstract  
Five port cities—Portland, Oregon; South Portland, Maine; Oakland, 
California; Longview, Washington; and Salt Lake City, Utah—have 
something in common: they all restricted the handling of fossil fuels at their 
shipping terminals.  Moreover, impacted industries have responded with 
nearly identical dormant Commerce Clause-based lawsuits against the first 
four of those localities.  This Article examines how much latitude cities have 
under the dormant Commerce Clause to restrict the handling of fossil fuels 
at their ports, using as case studies two recent court decisions upholding 
the ordinances of Portland, Oregon and South Portland, Maine under the 
dormant Commerce Clause.  In addition, because the shipment of Utah coal 
ties together the ports in Oakland, California, Salt Lake City, Utah, and 
Longview, Washington, this Article evaluates the constitutionality of 
Oakland’s and Salt Lake City’s fossil fuel handling ordinances, concluding 
that the dormant Commerce Clause provides ample room to restrict fossil 
fuels at these and other ports. 
 
I. Introduction 
On May 15, 2018, a federal district court in California handed down 
a ruling that had Utah’s coal country cheering, while leaving communities 
elsewhere to question the extent of their own authority to protect their 
health from fossil fuel emissions.1  The court struck down the City of 
Oakland’s coal-handling ban down as-applied to the Oakland Bulk and 
Oversized Terminal.2  This ruling in Oakland Bulk and Oversized Terminal 
v. City of Oakland3 (hereinafter “Oakland”) is now on appeal to the U.S. 
 
1. See Brian Maffly, In a Potential Boon to Rural Utah, Judge Overturns Oakland’s 
Ban on Coal Shipment Through its Port, SALT LAKE TRIB. (May 16, 2018), https:// 
perma.cc/AP8A-AEAH. 
2. Oakland Bulk & Oversized Terminal, LLC v. City of Oakland, 321 F. Supp. 3d 
986, 988–89 (N.D. Cal. 2018), appeal docketed, No. 18-16141 (9th Cir. June 20, 2018). 
3. 321 F. Supp. 3d 986 (N.D. Cal. 2018).  
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Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.4  If upheld, this ruling opens the 
door for five million tons of Utah coal to ship through Oakland each year,5 
with $53 million of Utah public funds supporting the Terminal’s 
development.6  Alternatively, if the Ninth Circuit overturns the district 
court’s contractually based ruling,7 the court may turn to the plaintiff’s 
alternative claims that the City’s actions violated the dormant Commerce 
Clause of the U.S. Constitution8 and were preempted by federal statutes.9  
The outcome of that decision could have far-reaching implications for other 
Utah coal cases and for other port cities seeking to limit fossil fuels, as 
explained below. 
On the same day as the release of the Oakland ruling favoring Utah 
coal, the State of Utah joined an amicus brief in Lighthouse Resources v. 
Inslee,10 arguing that the State of Washington violated the dormant 
Commerce Clause when it denied a permit for a coal terminal expansion in 
Longview, Washington.11  This lawsuit was brought by a Utah-based coal 
 
4. Id. 
5. See Oakland Bulk & Oversized Terminal, 321 F. Supp. 3d at 989–90; Brian 
Maffly, Utah’s Top Coal Producer is Fighting to Reverse a California City’s Ban on 
Exporting Coal and Open New Markets for Local Mines, SALT LAKE TRIB. (Jan. 8, 2018), 
https://perma.cc/GEA4-CKCA [hereinafter, Utah’s Top Coal Producer] (“The investment 
guaranteed 5 million to 10 million tons of Utah coal would move through the California 
terminal every year.”). 
6. See Press Release, EARTHJUSTICE, Utah Legislature Votes to Fund California Coal 
Export Terminal at Taxpayer Expense (Mar. 11, 2016), https://perma.cc/ZS2Q-J7LW; 
Utah’s Top Coal Producer, supra note 5. 
7. See Oakland Bulk & Oversized Terminal, 321 F. Supp. 3d at 992.  The district 
court’s decision was based solely on the contract between the City of Oakland and OBOT.  
Id.  The court deferred on addressing the constitutional and federal preemption claims raised 
by the plaintiffs, explaining that it would be “unnecessary to adjudicate those potentially 
more weighty questions if the case could be resolved on the breach of contract claim.”  Id. 
8. The dormant Commerce Clause is the judicially created doctrine that recognizes 
an implied limitation on states’ ability to limit interstate commerce, based on Congress’s 
Constitutionally delegated power to regulate interstate commerce.  See U.S. CONST. Art I., 
§8, cl. 3; see also infra Part III. 
9. Oakland Bulk & Oversized Terminal, 321 F. Supp. 3d at 991. The federal statutes 
that Plaintiffs alleged were violated include the “Interstate Commerce Commission 
Termination Act, the Hazardous Materials Transportation Act, and the Shipping Act of 
1984.”  Id.  
10. Lighthouse Resources Inc. v. Inslee, No. 3:18-cv-05005 (W.D. Wash. filed Jan. 
3, 2018). 
11. State of Wyoming, Kansas, Montana, Nebraska, South Dakota and Utah’s 
Motion for Leave to Participate as Amicus Curiae, Lighthouse Resources, Inc. v. Inlsee, No. 
3:18-cv-05005 (W.D. Wash. motion and brief filed May 8, 2018); see also Phuong Le, 5 
States Join Utah in Legal Fight over Washington State Coal-Export Terminal, SALT LAKE 
TRIB. (May 12, 2018), https://perma.cc/43TY-9LH9. 
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company and is making its way through a federal district court in 
Washington.12  
Following these developments, other courts have ruled on similar 
challenges to fossil fuel shipping-related restrictions in two more port 
cities: South Portland, Maine13 and Portland, Oregon.14  This time, 
however, the courts favored the cities in full15 and in part,16 respectively. 
An appeal of the U.S. District Court for the District of Maine’s decision in 
the South Portland, Maine case is currently pending in the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the First Circuit.17 
Finally, and most recently, in December 2018, Salt Lake City, Utah 
adopted an ordinance that restricts the handling and storing of coal and 
prohibits extractive industries and refineries18 in a new, to-be-developed 
“Utah Inland Port.”19  No legal challenges to Salt Lake City’s ordinance 
have been reported (yet), but a challenge would be unsurprising given the 
years-long political battle over the Inland Port and the state of Utah’s 
vigorous commitment to building it, despite protests by the local 
community, environmental groups, and the Mayor of Salt Lake.20  This 
 
12. The plaintiff, Lighthouse Resources, Inc., is headquartered in Salt Lake City, 
Utah.  Complaint at ¶¶ 4, 16, Lighthouse Resources Inc. v. Inslee, No. 3:18-cv-05005 (W.D. 
Wash. filed Jan. 3, 2018). 
13. Portland Pipe Line Corp. v. City of South Portland, 332 F. Supp. 3d 264 (D. Me. 
2018), appeal docketed, No. 18-02118 (1st Cir. Nov. 13, 2018). 
14. Columbia Pac. Bldg. Trades Council v. City of Portland, 412 P.3d 258 (Or. Ct. 
App.), cert. denied, 434 P.3d 29 (Or. 2018). 
15. City of South Portland, 332 F. Supp. 3d at 269 (holding South Portland’s 
ordinance blocking crude oil exports did not violate dormant Commerce Clause); see also 
Portland Pipe Line Corp. v. City of South Portland, 288 F. Supp. 3d 322 (D. Me. 2017) 
(holding South Portland’s ordinance was not preempted by state or federal laws). 
16. City of Portland, 412 P.3d at 261 (holding Portland’s ordinance did not violate 
dormant Commerce Clause but remanding with respect to certain factual findings). 
17. City of So. Portland, No. 18-02118 (1st Cir. filed Nov. 13, 2018). 
18. Salt Lake City, Utah, Ordinance No. 69-18 of 2018, An Ordinance Amending 
Various Sections of Title 21A of the Salt Lake City Code Pertaining to Regulation of Inland 
Port Uses (codified at SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH CODE, § 21A.34.150(E)(1)(b) (Sterling 
Codifiers through June 11, 2019)), https:// perma.cc/5LLG-SHPK; id. at § (B)(2)(f) (refinery 
and extractive industry prohibitions); see also Taylor Stevens, Salt Lake City Council Passes 
Rules Aimed at Regulating the Inland Port, a Massive Development Planned for the West 
Side, SALT LAKE TRIB. (Dec. 4, 2018), https://perma.cc/RTP5-4X3H. 
19. The Utah Inland Port was created by the Utah Legislature in March 2018.  Utah 
Inland Port Authority Act, S.B. 234 (Mar. 2018), as amended by Utah Inland Port Authority 
Amendments, H.B. 2001 (July 2018), Utah Code §§ 11-58-101–901 (2018). 
20. See Taylor Stevens, House Committee Approves Bill to Expand Inland Port over 
Opposition from Environmental Groups, SALT LAKE TRIB. (Mar 5, 2019), https:// 
perma.cc/M8CZ-5SW6 (describing a Utah state bill to expand the inland port into rural 
communities); Brian Maffly, Utah coal country’s push for a West Coast deep-water port 
resurfaces as Senate panel advances funding plan, SALT LAKE TRIB. (Mar. 11, 2019), 
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tension has already come to a head in the form of a lawsuit by Salt Lake 
City against the Port.21  A lawsuit in the other direction would be in line 
with the Utah Inland Port’s chaotic start and the aforementioned lawsuits 
in Oakland, Portland, and South Portland. 
The fate of a potential challenge against Salt Lake City’s ordinance 
may be heavily impacted by the appeals pending the First Circuit 22 and 
Ninth Circuit,23 over South Portland’s and Oakland’s respective fossil fuel 
shipping bans.  In addition, these lawsuits may have implications for the 
broader, nationwide trend of local and state efforts to limit fossil fuels and 
the accompanying trend of industry-led lawsuits challenging such 
regulations.24  Cities, in particular, have been leading the charge to reduce 
fossil fuel-related emissions25 in the face of growing climate change-related 
threats such as forest fires,26 heat-related deaths,27 and other extreme 
 
https://perma.cc/Y7NU-K3JR (describing ongoing moves by Utah officials to allocate $53 
million to the coal proposed terminal in Oakland, California).  
21. Katie McKeller, Salt Lake City Mayor Sues over ‘Gross State Overreach’ in Utah 
Inland Port Authority’s Creation, DESERET NEWS (Mar. 11, 2019), https://perma.cc/AZ2T-
QQY2.  Previously, Salt Lake City Mayor Biskupski had referenced potential Utah 
Constitutional challenges to the Port, and former Salt Lake City Mayor Ted Wilson alleged 
that the Utah Inland Port Authority violates the Utah Constitution’s “Ripper Clause.”  See 
Ted Wilson, Letter: Salt Lake Inland Port Will be Tied up in Court, SALT LAKE TRIB. (July 
23, 2018), https://perma.cc/RVM9-SSG2; see also Matthew Piper, Some Think One 
Sentence in the Utah Constitution Might Undo the Inland Port Authority, DESERET NEWS 
(July 30, 2018), https://perma.cc/RVM9-SSG2. 
22. City of South Portland, No. 18-02118 (1st Cir. filed Nov. 13, 2018). 
23. OBOT v. City of Oakland, No. 18-16141 (9th Cir. filed June 20, 2018). 
24. See generally Benjamin L. McCready, Note, Like it or Not, You’re Fracked: Why 
State Preemption of Municipal Bans are Unjustified in the Fracking Context, 9 DREXEL L. 
REV. ONLINE 61 (2016) (describing municipal regulation of oil and gas fracking and legal 
challenges to such regulation); Felix Mormann, Constitutional Challenges and Regulatory 
Opportunities for State Climate Policy Innovation, 41 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 189, 192 
(describing constitutional claims against state renewable portfolio standards, feed-in tariffs, 
and other climate and energy policies).  
25. See, e.g., Salt Lake City, Joint Resolution of Salt Lake City Council and Mayor 
Establishing Renewable Energy and Carbon Emissions Reduction Goals for Salt Lake City 
(Nov. 1, 2016), https://perma.cc/C4N4-VSTX; CITY OF SAN DIEGO CLIMATE ACTION PLAN, 
CITY OF SAN DIEGO (Dec. 2015), https://perma.cc/9VUC-JK52 (San Diego’s Climate Action 
Plan, which was adopted unanimously in December 2015, commits San Diego to 100% 
clean energy, achieving 50% of commutes via transit, walking, and biking, covering 35% 
of urban areas with tree canopy, and eliminating waste.); Chris Teale, Cities Bullish on Need 
to Lead at US Conference of Mayors’ Annual Meeting, SMARTCITIES DIVE (June 11, 2018), 
https://perma.cc/U7TW-L9KT.  
26. Matthew Brown, Driven by Climate Change, Fire Reshapes U.S. West, SALT 
LAKE TRIB. (Sept. 3, 2018), https://perma.cc/F4Z9-8GAJ. 
27. Jonathan Watts, We Have 12 years to Limit Climate Change Catastrophe, Warns 
UN, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 8, 2018), https://perma.cc/GY9Q-N33T. 
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weather events.28  While states like Utah fail to meet federal air quality 
standards,29 cities have been picking up the slack.  Cities are acting to 
counterbalance the Trump administration’s environmental rollbacks, which 
have included withdrawing the United States from the global Paris climate 
accord,30 repealing the Clean Power Plan,31 proposing to freeze greenhouse 
gas based fuel economy standards for cars,32 and repealing or loosening 
emissions standards on certain truck components,33 among other regressive 
actions.  City-level environmental action has taken many forms in recent 
years, including shifting to renewable energy, making buildings more 
efficient, promoting alternative transportation,34 and banning fracking.35 
 
28. Fiona Harvey, Why the Next Three Months are Crucial for the Future of the 
Planet, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 5, 2018), https://perma.cc/54H2-674R. 
29. See Emma Penrod, EPA Labels Utah Air-Quality Problems ‘serious’, SALT LAKE 
TRIB. (May 3, 2017), https://perma.cc/EHW7-5T33 (describing “serious” nonattainment for 
PM2.5 and how several areas in Utah, including the Salt Lake metro area, are in “serious non-
attainment” of National Ambient Air Quality Standards for fine particulate matter (PM2.5) 
and “marginal non-attainment” for ozone); Emma Penrod, Feds Give Utah Three Years to 
Bring Ozone Pollution Down to Acceptable Levels, SALT LAKE TRIB. (May 1, 2018), 
https://perma.cc/VP2Q-J4MZ (reporting seven Utah counties, including Salt Lake, were in 
violation of national ozone standards); Emma Penrod, Advocates Growing Impatient as 
Utah’s New Plan for Cleaner Air Falls Behind Schedule, SALT LAKE TRIB. (Aug. 25, 2017), 
https://perma.cc/7WSH-ZJDJ (describing Utah’s history of missing deadlines, and that state 
officials notified the U.S. EPA that Utah would likely miss the December 2017 deadline for 
its PM2.5 compliance plan); Status of SIP Required Elements for Utah Designated Areas, 
U.S. EPA, https://perma.cc/7E8C-FKDL (last visited Oct. 9, 2018) (showing 12/31/2017 
deadline for compliance reports for PM2.5 for Salt Lake City and Provo metro areas’ 
“serious” nonattainment, but none had not been submitted as of Oct. 9, 2018). 
30. Hiroko Tabuchi and Henry Fountain, Bucking Trump, These Cities, States and 
Companies Commit to Paris Accord, N.Y. TIMES (June 1, 2017), https://perma.cc/33Q4-
KP4G; Chris Teale, Report: US Almost halfway to achieving Paris climate goals thanks to 
city, state action, UTILITY DIVE (Sept. 14, 2018), https://perma.cc/K8CX-M7E6. 
31. The “Clean Power Plan” was adopted under the Obama administration and 
required states to implement controls on greenhouse gas emissions from existing power 
plants. 80 Fed. Reg. 64662 (Oct. 23, 2015). The Trump administration repealed the Clean 
Power Plan in August 2018. 83 Fed. Reg. 44746 (Aug. 31, 2018).  
32. The Safer Affordable Fuel Efficient (SAFE) Vehicles Rule for Model Years 
2021-2026 Passenger Cars and Light Trucks, 83 Fed. Reg. 42986 (proposed Aug. 24, 2018) 
(to be codified at: 49 C.F.R. pts 523, 531, 533, 536, and 537; and 40 C.F.R. pts 85-86); see 
also Coral Davenport and Hiroko Tabuchi, E.P.A. Prepares to Roll Back Rules Requiring 
Cars to be Cleaner and More Efficient, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 29, 2018), https://perma.cc/86EF-
53ZT. 
33. Juliet Eilperin, EPA plans to repeal emission standards for truck components, 
WASH. POST (Oct. 23, 2017), https://perma.cc/Z7UQ-F9XS. 
34. Jason Plautz, Survey: 57% of Cities Plan Climate Action in Next Year, UTILITY 
DIVE (Sept. 14, 2018), https://perma.cc/6KK4-SNBA. 
35. See generally McCready, supra note 24 (reviewing cases litigating municipal 
regulation of oil and gas fracking). 
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Legal scholarship has examined the authority of state36 and local37 
governments to adopt many kinds restrictions on fossil fuels.  However, 
there is a gap in scholarship addressing the particular trend embodied in the 
Oakland, South Portland, Portland, Lighthouse Resources, and Salt Lake 
City cases: local restrictions on the handling and storage of coal and oil in 
ports, and the legal backlash these restrictions have incited.  This Article 
fills that gap by examining this trend and its unique and emerging ties with 
Utah’s coal industry.38  Specifically, this Article observes that the fossil fuel 
industry has been serving ports with lawsuits that make the same three 
kinds of claims which are worthy of scholarly attention: (1) violation of the 
dormant Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution;39 (2) preemption by 
federal laws governing trains, ports, and pipelines; and (3) state preemption 
of municipal authority.40 
Moreover, this Article seeks to put the dormant Commerce Clause 
issues to rest, because local governments have a more important role than 
ever in ensuring all people to have healthy places to live, work, and play,41 
and because the same kinds of industry-led challenges keep recurring and 
may resurface in Salt Lake City.  Specifically, this Article examines how 
much latitude cities have under the dormant Commerce Clause to prohibit 
 
36. See, e.g., Mormann, supra note 24, at 192 (describing Constitutional challenges 
to state renewable portfolio standards, feed-in tariffs, and other state climate and energy 
policies); Tessa Gellerson, Extraterritoriality and the Electric Grid: North Dakota v. 
Heydinger, A Case Study for State Energy Regulation, 41 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV 563, 569-
70 (2017) (discussing an Eight Circuit decision striking down North Dakota’s Renewable 
Portfolio Standard). 
37. See, e.g., McCready, supra note 24 (reviewing litigation over municipal 
regulation of oil and gas fracking); Richard Briffault, The Challenge of the New Preemption, 
70 STAN. L. REV. 1997, 1998–99 (June 2018) (criticizing new and extreme efforts by states 
to preempt local government laws); Thomas Linzey and Daniel E. Brannen Jr., A Phoenix 
from the Ashes: Resurrecting A Constitutional Right of Local, Community Self-Government 
in the Name of Environmental Sustainability, 8 ARIZ. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 1, 8 (arguing 
“community self-governance” for environmental issues should be recognized as a 
fundamental right under the U.S. Constitution). 
38. See supra notes 5-12 and accompanying text. 
39. See supra note 8. 
40. Oakland Bulk & Oversized Terminal, LLC v. City of Oakland, 321 F. Supp. 3d 
986, 991 (N.D. Cal. 2018) appeal docketed, No. 18-16141 (9th Cir. June 20, 2018) 
(plaintiffs raised dormant Commerce Clause, federal preemption, and contractual claims); 
Portland Pipe Line Corp. v. City of South Portland, 332 F. Supp. 3d 264, 270 (D. Me. 2018) 
(plaintiffs raised dormant Commerce Clause, and federal and state preemption claims), 
appeal docketed, No. 18-02118 (1st Cir. filed Nov. 13, 2018); Columbia Pac. Bldg. Trades 
Council v. City of Portland, 412 P.3d 258, 261 (Or. Ct. App. 2018) (plaintiffs raised dormant 
Commerce Clause and state statute claims), cert. denied, 434 P.3d 29 (Or. 2018); Complaint 
at ¶11, Lighthouse Resources Inc. v. Inslee, 3:18-cv-05005 (W.D. Wash. filed Jan. 3, 2018) 
(raising dormant Commerce Clause and federal preemption claims). 
41. See supra notes 28-39 and accompanying text.  
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or restrict handling and storing coal and oil at ports, using the decisions in 
the Portland, Oregon42 and South Portland, Maine43 litigation as case 
studies and applying those lessons to the ordinances in Salt Lake City, Utah 
and Oakland, California.  This Article focuses on the dormant Commerce 
Clause because it is comparable across jurisdictions and because it seems 
particularly prone to revival in cases involving Utah coal, given that Utah 
officials raised dormant Commerce Clause claims in the Longview, 
Washington case44 and in a threatened suit over California’s cap-and-trade 
program.45 
This Article proceeds in Part II with background on the fossil fuel 
restrictions in five cities: South Portland, Maine; Portland, Oregon; 
Oakland, California; Longview, Washington; and Salt Lake City, Utah.  
Part III explores the parameters of the dormant Commerce Clause as 
established by the U.S. Supreme Court and U.S. Courts of Appeals and as 
applied by courts in the Portland and South Portland cases.  Part IV 
analyzes how those parameters comfortably allow the ordinances adopted 
by Salt Lake City and Oakland.  This Article concludes there is room under 
the dormant Commerce Clause for port cities to lawfully ban or restrict the 
storage and handling of fossil fuels. 
II. Background on Port-City Fossil Fuel Restrictions 
Multiple ports have imposed restrictions on storing and handling coal, 
crude oil, and fossil fuels.  This Part provides an overview of those 
restrictions in South Portland, Maine, Portland, Oregon, Longview, 
Washington, Oakland, California, and Salt Lake City, Utah, as well as an 
overview of the legal challenges that have arisen in the first four of those 
localities. 
A. South Portland, Maine’s “Clear Skies Ordinance” on Crude 
Oil Exports 
In July 2014, the City of South Portland, Maine, adopted its “Clear 
Skies Ordinance,” which essentially bars the export of crude oil by ship 
 
42. City of Portland, 412 P.3d 258. 
43. City of South Portland, 332 F. Supp. 3d at 269. 
44. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.  
45. See Brian Maffly, In a Potential Boon to Rural Utah, Judge Overturns Oakland’s 
Ban on Coal Shipment Through its Port, SALT LAKE TRIB. (May 16, 2018), https:// 
perma.cc/AP8A-AEAH (reporting that “Utah has set aside $1.5 million to sue California 
over its cap-and-trade program”); Brian Maffly, Are California Climate Policies Unfair to 
Utah?, SALT LAKE TRIB. (Feb. 12, 2018), https://perma.cc/6ZXX-ZQTV (reporting that 
Utah Rep. Mike Noel asserted California’s cap-and-trade system is “a clear violation of the 
U.S. Constitution’s Commerce Clause” because it makes Utah coal-powered electricity 
more expensive in California). 
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from South Portland’s waterfront.46  Specifically, the Clear Skies 
Ordinance blocks the “bulk loading of crude oil onto marine tank vessels” 
(also referred to as “tankers”).47  The Ordinance also bars the “storing and 
handling of petroleum and/or petroleum products” and the “construction” 
or “modification” of “new or existing facilities, structures, and equipment 
. . . for the purpose of bulk loading of crude oil” onto tankers.48  The City 
adopted this Ordinance after the Portland Pipe Line Corporation considered 
reversing the flow of a 70-year-old oil pipeline in order to export Canadian 
tar sands oil to international markets via South Portland.49 
In February 2015, the Portland Pipeline Corporation and the 
American Waterways Operators filed a lawsuit against the City of South 
Portland, alleging the Clear Skies Ordinance violated the dormant 
Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution, as well as the Equal Protection 
and Due Process Clauses, and was preempted by the Pipeline Safety Act, 
the Ports and Waterways Safety Act, and two state laws.50  In 2017, the 
U.S. District Court for the District of Maine ruled the Ordinance was not 
preempted by federal or state law.51  In August 2018, the court in Portland 
Pipe Line Corp. v. City of South Portland (hereinafter “South Portland”) 
upheld South Portland’s Clear Skies Ordinance against the dormant 
Commerce Clause challenge.52  An appeal of the district court’s decision is 
now pending in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.53 
 
46. City of South Portland, 332 F. Supp. 3d at 282–83. 
47. Id. 
48. Id. 
49. Id. at 276–82. 
50. Id. at 270.  The state law claims were brought under Maine’s Oil Discharge 
Prevention Law and South Portland’s comprehensive plan.  See id.  The plaintiffs also 
alleged the Ordinance is preempted by the President’s foreign affairs power and “the 
Constitution’s embedded principle of federal maritime governance.” Id.   
51. Portland Pipe Line Corp. v. City of South Portland, 288 F. Supp. 3d 322 (D. Me. 
2017) (holding that South Portland was entitled to Summary Judgement against the 
plaintiff’s federal and state preemption claims). 
52. City of South Portland, 332 F. Supp. 3d. at 298–316 (holding, after a bench trial, 
that South Portland’s ordinance did not violate the dormant Commerce Clause; specifically, 
the ordinance did not have an impermissible extraterritorial reach, nor did it discriminate 
against interstate commerce on its face, in effect, or on purpose, nor did it impose an 
excessive burden on interstate commerce, nor did it impermissibly interfere with foreign 
relations); see also Sabrina Shankman, South Portland’s Tar Sands Ban Upheld in a ‘David 
vs. Goliath’ Pipeline Battle, INSIDE CLIMATE NEWS (Aug. 28, 2018), https://perma.cc/ 
BV9A-C5PE. 
53. Portland Pipe Line Corp. v. City of South Portland, No. 18-02118 (1st Cir. filed 
Nov. 13, 2018). 
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B. Portland, Oregon’s Cap on Large Fossil Fuel Terminals 
In June 2016, the City of Portland, Oregon adopted a policy that 
prohibits the expansion or construction of “bulk fossil fuel terminals that 
store more than 2 million gallons of fossil fuel.”54  At the same time,  
the policy allowed exceptions for such large terminals in “places like 
airports . . . retail gas stations, and terminals built for distributors and 
wholesalers who receive and deliver fuel solely by trucks.”55 
Similar to the situation in South Portland, Maine, an industry group 
challenged the Portland, Oregon ordinance on multiple grounds, including 
alleged violations of the dormant Commerce Clause.  And, similar again to 
the outcome of the South Portland, Maine case, the Oregon Court of 
Appeals in Columbia Pac. Bldg. Trades Council v. City of Portland 
(hereinafter “Portland”) upheld Portland, Oregon’s policy against the 
dormant Commerce Clause challenge in January 2018.56  The Oregon 
Supreme Court declined to review this decision in July 2018.57  However, 
unlike the South Portland decision that struck down all of the plaintiff’s 
claims,58 the Portland, Oregon decision concluded the ordinance here did 
not meet a state requirement that land use decisions be supported by an 
“adequate factual basis,” because one of the city’s factual findings 
(forecasting a decline in fossil fuel demand) did not fully combat 
countervailing evidence.59  Therefore, although the court held the ordinance 
did not violate the dormant Commerce Clause, Portland must now provide 
additional facts to satisfy the state evidentiary standard before putting its 
ordinance into effect.60 
 
54. Columbia Pac. Bldg. Trades Council v. City of Portland, 412 P.3d 258, 262 (Or. 
Ct. App.), cert. denied, 434 P.3d 29 (Or. 2018).  By converse, the policy allowed terminals 
storing less than 2 million gallons of fossil fuels.  Id.  
55. Id.  
56. Id. at 261; see also Steve Law, Court Decision Means Portland Can Sharply 
Restrict Fossil Fuel Terminal Expansion, PORTLAND TRIB. (July 31, 2018), https://perma.cc/ 
C6NY-BGSN.  
57. Columbia Pac. Bldg. Trades Council v. City of Portland, 434 P.3d 29 (Or. 2018) 
(decision published without opinion, denying petition for review of 412 P.3d 258 (Or. Ct. 
App. 2018)).  
58. See id. at Part II. A.  
59. Columbia Pac. Bldg. Trades Council v. City of Portland, 412 P.3d 258, 268–271 
(Or. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 434 P.3d 29 (Or. 2018) (noting, however, that the court used a 
standard of review that was deferential to the Land Use Board of Appeal’s decision).  
60. See Sean Mahoney, A Tale of Two Portlands, CONSERVATION LAW FOUNDATION 
(Sept. 24, 2018), https://perma.cc/L6MG-JEYX. 
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C. Port of Longview, Washington Coal Terminal Permit Denials 
On January 3, 2018, a coal mining company headquartered in Salt 
Lake City, Utah, filed suit against the state of Washington for denying 
permits for a port facility that would export coal to Asia.61  The complaint 
alleges violation of the dormant Commerce Clause and preemption by the 
Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act and the Ports and 
Waterways Safety Act.62  The state of Utah joined an amicus brief 
supporting the plaintiff’s dormant Commerce Clause claim on the same day 
the Oakland district court ruling was released.63 
D. Oakland, California’s Coal Handling Ban 
Not every port city has fared as well in court as the two Portlands.64  
On May 15, 2018, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of 
California invalidated the City of Oakland, California’s application of a 
coal-handling ban to the Oakland Bulk and Oversized Terminal 
(“OBOT”).65  Four years earlier, a subsidiary of Utah’s largest coal 
producer, Bowie Resource Partners, secured the contractual right to 
manage the Oakland Terminal and ship approximately five million tons of 
Utah coal through it each year.66  Such a deal would be a boon to Utah’s 
coal industry, which has declined over the last two decades.67  In fact, 
annual production slipped to 13.9 million tons in 2016—the lowest reported 
amount since 1985.68  Hoping to help secure this potential boost to Utah 
coal shipping, the Utah Legislature allocated $53 million in 2016 to help 
 
61. Complaint at ¶¶ 4, 16, Lighthouse Resources Inc. v. Inslee, No. 3:18-cv-05005 
(W.D. Wash. filed Jan. 3, 2018). 
62. Id. at ¶11.  
63. State of Wyoming, Kansas, Montana, Nebraska, South Dakota and Utah’s 
Motion for Leave to Participate as Amicus Curiae, Lighthouse Resources, Inc. v. Inlsee, 
No. 3:18-cv-05005 (W.D. Wash., Motion and Brief Filed May 8, 2018); see also Le, 
supra note 11. 
64. See supra Sections II.A and II.B.  
65. Oakland Bulk & Oversized Terminal, LLC v. City of Oakland, 321 F. Supp. 3d 
986, 988–89 (N.D. Cal. 2018), appeal docketed, OBOT v. City of Oakland, No. 18-16141 
(9th Cir. filed June 20, 2018). 
66. The City of Oakland contracted with OBOT in 2012-13 to develop a bulk goods 
shipping terminal.  Oakland Bulk and Oversized Terminal, 321 F. Supp. 3d at 988–90.  
OBOT later contracted with Terminal Logistics Solutions to design and manage the 
terminal.  Id.  Terminal Logistics Solutions is a wholly owned by Bowie Resource Partners.  
Id.  In September 2015, OBOT gave the City initial plans for the terminal, including plans 
to handle roughly 5 million metric tons of coal there each year.  Id.; see also Utah’s Top 
Coal Producer, supra note 5. 
67. GOVERNOR’S OFFICE OF ENERGY DEVELOPMENT, ADVANCING UTAH COAL 9 
(May 2017), https://perma.cc/8TCG-RZCB. 
68. Id. 
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fund the Oakland Terminal’s development.69  However, before 
development of the Terminal got off the ground, public outcry over news 
of the Utah coal plan prompted the Oakland City Council to hold two public 
hearings and hire an outside consultant to analyze the project’s health and 
safety impacts.70  The City Council then approved an ordinance in 2016 
which prohibited the storage and handling of coal at bulk goods facilities 
in Oakland.71  The City also adopted a resolution applying the ban to 
OBOT72 on the grounds that it was “necessary to prevent conditions 
substantially dangerous to the health and/or safety of . . . adjacent 
Neighbors.”73  OBOT quickly responded to Oakland’s ordinance with a 
lawsuit claiming breach of contract, preemption by three federal laws 
regulating rail transportation, and violation of the Dormant Commerce 
Clause.74 
Importantly, the district court’s ruling in Oakland was decided solely 
on contractual grounds, as-applied, and not dormant Commerce Clause or 
other federal preemption claims.75  The court found “the record before the 
City Council [did] not contain substantial evidence that OBOT’s proposed 
operations would pose a substantial danger to the health or safety of people 
in Oakland,” which the contract required before the City could apply new 
laws to the Terminal.76  The court then held that “the resolution applying 
the coal ordinance to the OBOT facility is invalid.”77  Thus, the district 
court did not invalidate the entire coal ban ordinance; it only invalidated 
the application to OBOT, and only on contractual grounds, while expressly 
leaving Oakland “free . . . to pursue future regulation of the project” after 
 
69. Utah’s Top Coal Producer, supra note 5; see also Press Release, EARTHJUSTICE, 
supra note 6.  
70. Oakland Bulk & Oversized Terminal, 321 F. Supp. at 990. 
71. City of Oakland, California, Ordinance No. 13385 (July 19, 2016). 
72. City of Oakland, California, Resolution No. 86234 (July 19, 2016). 
73. Oakland Bulk & Oversized Terminal, 321 F. Supp. at 991. 
74. Id.  The complaint alleged Oakland’s ordinance is preempted by the federal 
Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act (ICCTA), the Hazardous Materials Act, 
and the Shipping Act of 1984.  Id. 
75. See id. at 992 (declining to address the constitutional and federal preemption 
claims by explaining it would be “unnecessary to adjudicate those potentially more weighty 
questions if the case could be resolved on the breach of contract claim”). 
76. Id.  The health and safety finding by the City was necessary because the contract 
precluded the application of most new laws to OBOT, but reserved the City’s right to apply 
new laws if it “determines based on substantial evidence and after a public hearing that 
failure to do so would place . . . adjacent neighbors . . . in a condition substantially dangerous 
to their health or safety.”  Id. 
77. Id. at 1010. 
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developing “a record that more carefully and thoroughly la[ys] out the 
evidence.”78 
In other words, although the district court’s contract-based decision is 
on appeal in the Ninth Circuit,79 even if the City of Oakland loses that 
appeal, the City still has the ability to apply its ban to OBOT in the future, 
after developing additional evidence.  Alternatively, if the Ninth Circuit 
overturns the district court’s ruling on the contract issue, the case may get 
remanded to the district court to consider OBOT’s alternative claim that the 
City’s ban violates the dormant Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution.  
Part IV of this Article analyzes how a court might rule on OBOT’s dormant 
Commerce Clause claim. 
For now, however, Utah coal supporters should not feel emboldened 
by the district court’s decision in Oakland because (as explained above) the 
court’s holding was based on a fact-specific contract claim and, therefore, 
it has limited applicability elsewhere.  Moreover, because the district court 
never reached the dormant Commerce Clause claim, this issue is still 
unresolved and provides no precedent for industries making dormant 
Commerce Clause claims elsewhere.  However, one thing that is clear—
and in industries’ favor—from both the Oakland and Portland80 decisions 
is that cities seeking to restrict fossil fuels will need to be more vigilant in 
providing evidentiary bases for their ordinances. 
E. Salt Lake City, Utah “Inland Port” Zoning Restrictions  
While the Oakland, South Portland, and Longview, Washington 
lawsuits were pending in federal district courts, and while the Oregon 
Supreme Court was considering Portland’s petition for review, the Utah 
Legislature passed a law in March 2018 that approves development of a 
“Utah Inland Port” in Salt Lake City and West Valley81 with the objectives 
of “facilitat[ing] the transportation of goods,” “coordinating trade-related 
opportunities to export Utah products nationally and internationally,” 
“connect[ing] local businesses to potential foreign markets for 
exportation,” and being a “hub for trade combining rail, trucking, air cargo, 
and other transportation.”82  This new state law required Salt Lake City to 
adopt an ordinance by December 31, 2018, to allow “port uses,” and 
 
78. Id. at 1009–1010.  
79. OBOT v. City of Oakland, No. 18-16141 (9th Cir. filed June 20, 2018). 
80. See supra notes 59, 76, and accompanying text. 
81. See Utah Inland Port Authority Act, 2018 Utah Laws Ch. 179 (S.B. 234) 
(codified as amended at UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 11-58-101–901 (West, Westlaw through 2019 
General Sess.)). 
82. UTAH CODE ANN. § 11-58-203 (West, Westlaw through 2019 General Sess.). 
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expressly barred the city from prohibiting “natural resources”83—a move 
reportedly intended to avoid an Oakland-style coal ban.84  
In compliance with the state’s mandate, Salt Lake City unanimously 
adopted a zoning ordinance on December 4, 201885 that prohibits any 
“extractive industry” or “refinery [of] petroleum products” from the Inland 
Port Overlay District,86 but allows natural resources, coal, and crude oil, 
with restrictions.87  Specifically, any “natural resource and bulk material 
storage” facility larger than 500 square feet in area must be located at least 
1,000 feet from a residential zone or state prison facility, and must be 
contained within walls higher than the pile of materials, using “fugitive dust 
control measures.”88  In addition, the “unloading, loading, transfer, or 
temporary storage of coal, coal byproducts, and crude oil,” must be in “an 
enclosed building,” or in a covered rail car, or in an open rail car where the 
material has been “sprayed with surfactant to reduce dust,” and such 
activity must be at least 1,000 feet from “environmentally sensitive 
areas.”89  These standards contain an exception for “existing landfills” and 
for when storage is “necessary for public safety purposes, such as the 
storage of de-icing materials used on public streets.”90  As mentioned 
above, no challenges to Salt Lake’s restrictions have surfaced yet,91 but this 
Article hypothesizes how claims mirroring those in the two Portlands, 
Oakland, or Longview cases could arise and how dormant Commerce 
Clause claims could be resolved. 
 
83. Id. at §§ 11-58-205(5), (6). 
84. Taylor Anderson, Just Days Before a Planned Special Session to Fix Utah’s 
Controversial Inland Port Bill, Negotiations Broke Down Between Governor and Salt Lake 
Mayor, SALT LAKE TRIB. (May 19, 2018), https://perma.cc/MKW8-4YC6 (quoting Utah 
House Speaker Greg Hughes discussing how “too much control over the port by Salt Lake 
City could . . . lead to political fighting over whether the region becomes an area for shipping 
coal. Such a fight recently played out in Oakland, Calif., which tried to ban the shipment of 
coal . . . .”). 
85. Salt Lake City, Utah, Ordinance No. 69-18 of 2018, An Ordinance Amending 
Various Sections of Title 21A of the Salt Lake City Code Pertaining to Regulation of Inland 
Port Uses (codified at SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH CODE, § 21A.34.150 (Sterling Codifiers 
through June 11, 2019)), https://perma.cc/5LLG-SHPK; see also Salt Lake City Council 
Meeting Video (Dec. 4, 2018), https://slc.primegov.com/portal/Meeting?compiledMeet 
ingDocumentId=7599 (unanimous vote, no discussion, at 1:04-1:05); see also Stevens, 
supra note 18. 
86. SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH, CODE § 21A.34.150 (B)(2)(f) (Sterling Codifiers 
through June 11, 2019). 
87. Id. at § (E)(1)(a), (b). 
88. Id. at § (E)(1)(b)).  
89. Id. at § (E)(1)(b). 
90. Id. at § (E)(1)(c), (d). 
91. See supra Part I, at notes 20-21. 
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III.  Dormant Commerce Clause Parameters for Fossil Fuel 
Handling Restrictions in Port Cities 
The U.S. Supreme Court has long accepted that Congress’s 
Constitutional power to “regulate Commerce with foreign nations and 
among the several states”92 not only authorizes Congressional action, it also 
impliedly “denies the States the power unjustifiably to discriminate against 
or burden the interstate flow of articles of commerce.”93  This doctrine, 
known as the dormant Commerce Clause, seeks to protect what the Court 
has described as the Framers’ intent to avoid states (and their political 
subdivisions, i.e., cities) from engaging in “economic Balkanization”94 or 
“economic protectionism—that is, regulatory measures designed to benefit 
in-state economic interests by burdening out-of-state competitors.”95  
However, the doctrine is tempered by the Court’s recognition that the 
“Framers’ distrust of economic Balkanization was limited by their 
federalism favoring a degree of local autonomy.”96  In other words, the 
dormant Commerce Clause is not an absolute bar on all state and local 
regulation touching interstate commerce.  Rather, courts examine if a state 
or local law offends the Commerce Clause using a four-pronged test.97  (A) 
First, a state or local law that “discriminates” against interstate commerce 
faces a “virtually per se rule of invalidity,”98 but may survive if it “serves a 
legitimate local purpose” which “could not be served as well by available 
nondiscriminatory means.”99  (B) Conversely, if a law is nondiscriminatory 
or “regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local public purpose, 
and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld 
unless the burden imposed on [interstate] commerce is clearly excessive in 
relation to the putative local benefits.”100  (C) Third, a law violates the 
dormant Commerce Clause if it has an impermissible “extraterritorial” 
 
92. U.S. CONST. art. I, §8, cl. 3.  
93. Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality of State of Or., 511 U.S. 93, 98 
(1994); see also New Energy Co. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 273 (1988) (stating that the 
Commerce Clause “limits the power of the States to discriminate against interstate 
commerce”). 
94. Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 325 (1979).  
95. New Energy Co., 486 U.S. at 273. 
96. Dep’t of Revenue of Ky. V. Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 338 (2008). 
97. This Article discusses all four potential prongs of the dormant Commerce Clause, 
including the dormant foreign commerce clause, because all four have the potential to be 
raised against local laws regulating the shipping and handling of fossil fuels at ports, as 
evidenced by Portland Pipe Line Corp. v. City of South Portland, 332 F. Supp. 3d 264, 296 
(D. Me. 2018). 
98. E.g., Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978). 
99. Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 138 (1986) (citations omitted). 
100. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). 
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reach.101  (D) Finally, a state or local law violates the dormant Commerce 
Clause if it “interferes with the federal government’s ability to speak with 
one voice when regulating commerce with foreign nations.”102  This Part 
assesses the parameters of each prong using relevant Supreme Court and 
Courts of Appeals decisions, and how those parameters were correctly 
applied in the Portland and South Portland cases.  
A. Local Restrictions on Fossil Fuels are Not Inherently 
Discriminatory 
This Section discusses a threshold question in the four-pronged 
dormant Commerce Clause analysis summarized immediately above.  
Namely, this Section details how courts determine whether a state or local 
law “discriminates” against interstate commerce and, further, how courts 
have answered this question when examining fossil fuel restrictions, 
including those in Portland and South Portland.  
Whether a law “discriminates” against out-of-state commerce is a 
threshold question because U.S. Supreme Court precedent holds that if a 
state or local law does discriminate, then that law is unconstitutional unless 
the government proves it “serves a legitimate local purpose, and . . . this 
purpose could not be served as well by available nondiscriminatory 
means.”103  Discrimination “means differential treatment of in-state and 
out-of-state economic interests that benefits the former and burdens the 
latter.”104  A law may be found discriminatory [1] “on its face or [2] in 
practical effect,”105 or [3] if it has a “discriminatory purpose.”106  
 
101. Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 336 (1989). Courts and scholars have 
questioned whether the test of “extraterritoriality” should be considered a test in and of itself 
or whether it simply folds, or should fold, into the other two tiers.  See Gellerson, supra note 
36, at 569–70 (arguing that extraterritoriality should be folded into the Pike balancing test, 
particularly for state regulations of electric power).  Compare Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of 
Am. v. Cty. of Alameda, 768 F.3d 1037, 1039 (9th Cir. 2014) (using a “two-tiered approach” 
to the dormant Commerce Clause, which did not include extraterritoriality), with Energy & 
Env’t Legal Inst. v. Epel, 793 F.3d 1169, 1171–72 (10th Cir. 2015) (analyzing a Colorado 
energy law under the extraterritoriality doctrine, while calling the doctrine the “most 
dormant” of dormant Commerce Clause tests); Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 
730 F.3d 1070, 1101–04 (9th Cir. 2013) (finding that California’s low carbon fuel standard 
did not regulate extraterritorially). 
102. Portland Pipe Line Corp. v. City of South Portland, 332 F. Supp. 3d 264, 296 
(D. Me. 2018), appeal docketed, No. 18-02118 (1st Cir. Nov. 13, 2018).  
103. Taylor, 477 U.S. at 138 (citations and internal quotations omitted). 
104. E.g., Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality of State of Or., 511 U.S. 
93, 99 (1994). 
105. Taylor, 477 U.S. at 138 (citations and internal quotations omitted). 
106. Bacchus Imps. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 270–71 (1984). 
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This Section examines the parameters of these three kinds of 
discrimination, specifically as applied to fossil fuel regulations.  This 
Section also highlights how Portland’s and South Portland’s fossil fuel 
shipping ordinances were found by the courts to be nondiscriminatory 
under all three kinds of discrimination.  Finally, this Section concludes that 
those rulings in Portland and South Portland were correct and in-line with 
the precedent of the U.S. Supreme Court and U.S. Courts of Appeals.  
Later, Section B will explore how courts have easily upheld fossil fuel 
regulations after finding them to be nondiscriminatory, but even a 
discriminatory fossil fuel regulation could be upheld. 
1. Fossil fuel restrictions based on fuel type do not “facially 
discriminate” 
A state or local law is facially “discriminatory” under dormant 
Commerce Clause jurisprudence if it treats products differently based on 
state boundaries alone.107  On the flip-side, a local ordinance that “does not 
distinguish between out-of-state and instate interests” is not facially 
discriminatory.108  However, even if a local law does make geographic 
distinctions, the U.S. Supreme Court explained in Philadelphia v. New 
Jersey109 that such a law is only “discriminatory” when it is without “some 
reason, apart from their origin, to treat [foreign and local products] 
differently.”110  The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit interpreted 
this to mean that a law is “not facially discriminatory simply because it 
affects in-state and out-of-state interests unequally.”111  Rather, the Ninth 
 
107. Or. Waste Sys., 511 U.S. at 99–100 (finding Oregon’s surcharge on disposal of 
out-of-state waste “patently discriminates against interstate commerce,” where the fee 
differential was based on geographic distinction alone, and the out-of-state waste was no 
more harmful or costly than waste generated within the state). 
108. Portland Pipe Line Corp. v. City of South Portland, 332 F. Supp. 3d 264, 300–
08 (D. Me. 2018) (relying on Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978)), appeal 
docketed, No. 18-02118 (1st Cir. Nov. 13, 2018). 
109. Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978). 
110. Id. at 627 (holding that New Jersey’s law was facially discriminatory because it 
barred out-of-state waste on the basis of geographic origin alone, and out-of-state waste 
posed no greater threat than in-state waste).  
111. Rocky Mt. Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070, 1089–91 (9th Cir. 2013). 
The Supreme Court previously stated the “justification for[] a law has no bearing on whether 
it is facially discriminatory,” and a law is discriminatory if it makes any “geographic 
distinction.”  Or. Waste Sys., 511 U.S. at 100.  However, as the Ninth Circuit observed, the 
Supreme Court’s holdings accompanying such statements were based on situations in which 
“no nondiscriminatory reason for the distinction was shown.”  Rocky Mt. Farmers Union, 
730 F.3d at 1089 (citing Or. Waste Sys., 511 U.S. at 101 n.5; Chem. Waste v. Hunt, 504 
U.S. 334, 244 n.7 (1992)).  Therefore, the Ninth Circuit extrapolated that a law with 
locational differences is nondiscriminatory if “location affects actual emissions” and 
“impose[s] higher costs.”  Id. at 1089–90.  Some scholars argue the Ninth Circuit erred in 
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Circuit held in Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey112 and American 
Fuel & Petrochemical Manufacturers v. O’Keeffe113—both of which the 
U.S. Supreme Court declined to review114—that a law with geographic 
distinctions is nondiscriminatory if there is “some reason, apart from their 
origin, to treat them differently.”115  Such reasons may include when out-
of-state products impose greater harm, and the state simply “recover[s] the 
increased cost through a differential charge on [the] out-of-state” 
product,116 so long as the difference is “calibrated to the actual risk 
imposed.”117 
In the context of fossil fuels, therefore, if “an out-of-state [fuel] 
actually cause[s] more . . . emissions for each unit produced . . . [the state] 
can base its regulatory treatment on these emissions.”118  Thus, a law that 
makes in-state sales of some kinds of fuels “less attractive” is 
nondiscriminatory so long as it “treats [fuels] by all producers the same way 
based on the real risks posed” and “measures real differences in the harmful 
effects” on the locality.119 
Using the above principles, the Ninth Circuit held in Rocky Mountain 
Farmers Union that California’s Low Carbon Fuel Standard was not 
“facially discriminatory” even though it used some locational factors to 
calculate the fuels’ “Carbon Intensity” ratings, which made some out-of-
state fuels “less attractive” (while making some more economical) to sell 
 
finding California’s Fuel Standard nondiscriminatory, but that the Fuel Standard could 
nonetheless have survived strict scrutiny.  Hwi Harold Lee, Dormant Commerce Clause 
Review: Why the Ninth Circuit in Corey Strayed from Precedent and What the Supreme 
Court Could have Done About It, 40 B.C. ENVT. AFF. L. REV. E. SUPP. 54, 64–65 (2015).  
112. Rocky Mt. Farmers Union, 730 F.3d at 1089–91. 
113. Am. Fuel & Petrochemical Mfrs. v. O’Keeffe, 903 F.3d 903, 911–912 (9th Cir. 
2018) (finding that Oregon’s low carbon fuel standard was not facially discriminatory, based 
on the precedent of Rocky Mt. Farmers Union, 730 F.3d at 1090), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 
2043 (2019). 
114. Rocky Mt. Farmers Union v. Corey, 573 U.S. 946 (2014) (denying cert. over 
California’s Low Carbon Fuel Standard); Corey v. Rocky Mt. Farmers Union, 573 U.S. 947 
(2014) (same); Am. Fuel & Petrochemical Mfrs. Ass’n v. Corey, 134 S. Ct. 2875 (2014) 
(same); Am. Fuel & Petrochemical Mfrs. v. O’Keeffe, 139 S. Ct. 2043 (2019) (denying cert. 
over Oregon’s fuel standard). 
115. Rocky Mt. Farmers Union, 730 F.3d at 1089 (quoting Philadelphia v. New 
Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 627 (1978)); Am. Fuel & Petrochemical Mfrs., 903 F.3d at 911–912 
(quoting Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 626–27 (1978)). 
116. Rocky Mt. Farmers Union, 730 F.3d at 1089 (citing Or. Waste Sys. v. Dep’t of 
Envtl. Quality of State of Or., 511 U.S. 93, 101, n.5 (1994). 
117. Id. (citing Chem. Waste Mgmt. v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334, 344 (1992)). 
118. Id. at 1090. 
119. Id. at 1091–92. 
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in California.120  The court reasoned that, even if out-of-state fuels had 
different carbon ratings than their California counterparts and thus differing 
costs of competing in the California market, such distinctions were based 
on the “nondiscriminatory reason” that they “actually cause more 
[greenhouse gas] emissions.”121  Following this precedent, the Ninth Circuit 
also upheld Oregon’s fuel standard in American Fuel & Petrochemical 
Manufacturers v. O’Keeffe, finding the law was not facially discriminatory 
because it distinguished between fuels based on “carbon intensity,” not 
geographic origin.122 
Similarly, the U.S. District Court for the District of Maine also found 
the City of South Portland, Maine’s fossil fuel regulation to be 
nondiscriminatory on its face in South Portland.123  However, the South 
Portland ordinance did not test the boundaries of the dormant Commerce 
Clause facial discrimination doctrine as far as the California and Oregon 
fuel laws discussed in the preceding paragraph. Although South Portland’s 
ordinance effectively barred the export of crude oil by ship from the city’s 
port and also barred facilities that would support such exports, South 
Portland’s ordinance—unlike the California and Oregon fuel standards—
made “no explicit mention of source, destination, or residency.  Facially, it 
binds local entities to the same extent as entities based . . . outside the 
state.”124  Rather, South Portland’s ordinance “applies with equal force to 
any entity seeking to load crude oil” in the regulated zones.”125  Therefore, 
when the District of Maine held in South Portland held that the city’s 
ordinance was “not facially discriminatory,”126 the court was well within 
the dormant Commerce Clause bounds pushed by other circuits, namely the 
Ninth Circuit. 
 
120. Id. at 1083–1107.  The rating system took into account a variety of factors from 
production through consumption of the fuels, including shipping-related emissions, 
efficiency of production, and the type of electricity used in production.  “Credits” were given 
to fuels with low Carbon Intensity ratings, and “deficits” were given to high Carbon 
Intensity fuels.  Although fuels with high Carbon Intensity ratings may still be sold in 
California by purchasing carbon “credits,” the system makes it less economical for high-
carbon fuels to participate.  Id. at 1080.  The Fuel Standard did not hurt all out-of-state fuels; 
rather, some Midwest ethanols had the highest Carbon Intensity values, while others had the 
lowest, and Brazilian ethanol had the lowest Carbon Intensity ratings.  Id. at 1092–93. 
121. Id. at 1089–90.  
122. Am. Fuel & Petrochemical Mfrs. v. O’Keeffe, 903 F.3d 903, 911–912 (9th Cir. 
2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 2043 (2019). 
123. See Portland Pipe Line Corp. v. City of South Portland, 332 F. Supp. 3d 264, 
300 (D. Me. 2018), appeal docketed, No. 18-02118 (1st Cir. Nov. 13, 2018). 
124. Id. 
125. Id. 
126. Id. 
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In Portland, Oregon, facial discrimination was not even alleged, as 
the ordinance there simply prohibits any new large fossil fuel terminal in 
the city, regardless of the origins of the company or fuel.127  Nonetheless, 
the Oregon court analyzed Portland’s ordinance against the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s reasoning in Philadelphia v. New Jersey128—a seminal facial 
discrimination case—and concluded the ordinance did not discriminate 
because it does not “bar fuel exports to or through Portland, but [rather] 
place[s] restrictions on the size of certain fuel terminals that may be used 
as export facilities.”129  Therefore, like the U.S. District Court for the 
District of Maine, the Oregon Court of Appeals here was well within 
dormant Commerce Clause facial discrimination holdings of other courts. 
2. Fossil fuel restrictions do not have a “practical effect” of 
discrimination if there is no competition between 
substantially similar entities, nor if only local entities are 
harmed, nor if differentiation is based on harm caused by 
out-of-state products 
As discussed above, a state or local law faces a presumption of 
unconstitutionality under the dormant Commerce Clause if it 
“discriminates” against out-of-state commerce on its face, in practical 
effect, or in its purpose.130  This Subsection examines the parameters of the 
second type of discrimination—“practical effect”—and how courts have 
applied this test to fossil fuel regulations, including Portland’s and South 
Portland’s ordinances on oil storing and shipping. 
Absent facial discrimination, a local law may still be considered 
discriminatory if it has the “practical effect” of excluding out-of-state 
products from being sold in-state131 or “causes local goods to constitute a 
larger share, and goods with an out-of-state source to constitute a smaller 
share, of the total sales in the market.”132  In other words, in order to prevail, 
“the claimant must show both how local economic actors are favored by 
 
127. Columbia Pac. Bldg. Trades Council v. City of Portland, 412 P.3d 258, 261–63 
(Or. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 2018 Ore. LEXIS 588 (Or. July 26, 2018). 
128. Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624–29 (holding that New Jersey’s 
law was facially discriminatory because it barred out-of-state waste on the basis of 
geographic origin alone, and out-of-state waste posed no greater threat than in-state waste). 
129. City of Portland, 412 P.3d at 265. 
130. See discussion supra at notes 103–106. 
131. Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354 (1951) (holding that a city 
ordinance, which prohibited the sale of milk unless it was bottled within five miles of the 
city square, “plainly discriminates against interstate commerce” because in “practical effect 
[it] excludes from distribution in Madison wholesome milk produced and pasteurized [out-
of-state],” even though it also excluded milk from other distant in-state cities).   
132. Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Md., 437 U.S. 117, 126 n.16 (1978). 
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the legislation, and how out-of-state actors are burdened.”133  An allegation 
of discrimination under the dormant Commerce Clause also requires a 
“comparison of substantially similar entities” and “actual or prospective 
competition between the supposedly favored and disfavored entities in a 
single market.”134  Thus, “[t]he fact that the burden of a state regulation 
falls on some interstate companies [or types of companies] does not, by 
itself, establish a claim of discrimination against interstate commerce.”135 
As referenced in the prior Subsection, the Ninth Circuit in Rocky 
Mountain Farmers Union examined the degree to which California’s Low 
Carbon Fuel Standard impacted similar in-state and out-of-state crude oil 
producers.  The court held that the Fuel Standard’s crude oil provisions did 
not have a discriminatory “practical effect,” even though it partially 
correlated oil production location with “carbon intensity” ratings, which 
influences the in-state price.136  The court reasoned that the Fuel Standard 
both benefitted and burdened various in-state fuels, and both benefitted and 
burdened various out-of-state fuels.137  The Ninth Circuit subsequently 
explained in American Fuel & Petrochemical Manufacturers that Rocky 
Mountain Farmers Union established that a fuel regulation “based on the 
real risks posed” is “not a dormant Commerce Clause violation” and, under 
that premise, held that Oregon’s low carbon fuel standard did not 
discriminate in effect.138 
State and local laws may go even further than the California and 
Oregon fuel standards described above and may outright exclude one kind 
 
133. Eastern Ky. Res. v. Fiscal Court of Magoffin Cty., Ky., 127 F.3d 532, 543 (6th 
Cir. 1997). 
134. Gen. Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 298–300 (1997). 
135. Exxon, 437 U.S. at 126; see also Energy & Env’t Legal Inst. v. Epel, 793 F.3d 
1169, 1171–73 (10th Cir. 2015) (finding Colorado’s Renewable Portfolio Standard “does 
not discriminate against out-of-staters” even though it “effectively means some out-of-state 
coal producers . . . will lose business”). 
136. Rocky Mt. Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070, 1099–1101 (9th Cir. 2013). 
However, the court remanded the issue of “whether the Fuel Standard’s ethanol provisions 
discriminate in purpose or in practical effect.”  Id. at 1078 (emphasis added).  On remand, 
the district court denied the Defendants’ motion to dismiss the discriminatory effects claim, 
ruling that more information was needed on “how much ethanol the affected producers 
import to California,” in order to “assess adequately the extent to which ethanol producers 
are benefited or burdened” by the Fuel Standard. Rocky Mt. Farmers Union v. Corey, 258 
F. Supp. 3d 1134, 1162–63 (E.D. Cal. 2017).  However, that order was also based on an 
allegation that California had changed its standards to artificially aid in-state fuels.  Am. 
Fuel & Petrochemical Mfrs. v. O’Keeffe, 903 F.3d 903, 915 (9th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 
139 S. Ct. 2043 (2019) (clarifying the basis for decision in Rocky Mountain Farmers Union). 
137. Rocky Mt. Farmers Union, 730 F.3d at 1099–1101.  
138. Am. Fuel & Petrochemical Mfrs. v. O’Keeffe, 903 F.3d at 914–915. 
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of group or product without being deemed discriminatory.139  This was the 
situation in Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland,140 where the U.S. 
Supreme Court held that a state law blocking all petroleum producers and 
refiners from operating retail service stations in-state was not 
discriminatory, even though 95% of the businesses blocked by the law were 
out-of-state companies141 and even though “at least three refiners w[ould] 
stop selling” gas in-state.142  The Court reasoned that the law did not 
“distinguish between in-state and out-of-state companies in the retail 
market.”143  Rather, the law simply prohibited one particular kind of 
business, retail service stations operated by petroleum producers or 
refiners, which was allowable because the Commerce Clause does not 
“protect[] the particular structure or methods of operation” of the interstate 
market.144 
Consistent with Exxon, the court in Portland, Oregon held that 
Portland’s ordinance, which generally prohibits large “bulk fossil fuel 
terminals,” did not have a discriminatory “practical effect” even though it 
allowed exceptions for fuel terminals in “airports . . . retail gas stations, and 
terminals built for distributors and wholesalers who receive and deliver fuel 
solely by trucks.”145  The court concluded the ordinance does not “disfavor 
out-of-state exporters when compared to ‘substantially similar’ in-state 
exporters because there are no producers, refiners, or distributors in 
Portland or Oregon, much less ones that export fuel to national or 
international markets.”146  The court also rebuffed the plaintiff’s assertion 
that the ordinance discriminates by “disfavor[ing] out-of-state sellers of 
fossil-fuels” while “favor[ing] local, in-state purchasers and end users” via 
“exceptions for facilities that serve local end users of fuel.”147  Out-of-state 
exporters, the court explained, are not “substantially similar entities” to in-
 
139. See Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 626–29 (1978) (explaining that 
New Jersey could legitimately pursue its goal of preventing the environmental harms caused 
by waste by “slowing the flow of all waste into the State’s remaining landfills, even though 
interstate commerce may be incidentally affected,” but holding that New Jersey’s law was 
facially discriminatory because it barred out-of-state waste on the basis of geographic origin 
alone, and the out-of-state waste posed no greater threat than waste generated in-state.  The 
law was facially discriminatory because the state could not show “some reason, apart from 
origin, to treat them differently.”). 
140. 437 U.S. 117 (1978). 
141. Id. at 138 (Blackmun, dissenting). 
142. Id. at 127 (majority). 
143. Id. at 126. 
144. Id. at 127. 
145. Columbia Pac. Bldg. Trades Council v. City of Portland, 412 P.3d 258, 262 (Or. 
Ct. App. 2018), cert. denied, 434 P.3d 29 (Or. 2018). 
146. Id. at 265 (emphasis added) (citing Exxon, 437 U.S. at 125). 
147. Id. at 264. 
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state end users, and thus no comparison could be made for a dormant 
Commerce Clause discrimination claim.148 
Similarly, in South Portland, Maine, the court correctly held that the 
City’s ordinance—which prohibits the loading of crude oil onto tankers and 
bars the construction of supporting facilities—was not “discriminatory in 
practical effect.”149  The court reasoned that there were “no direct [out-of-
state] competitors to suffer a relative disadvantage” because there were no 
local producers or shippers who could benefit.150  Further, the court 
continued, “the entities most directly harmed [a pipeline company and a 
tugboat company] by the practical effects of the Ordinance are in-state, 
local businesses.”151  The court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the 
ordinance had the “practical effect of completely blocking flows of crude 
oil from Canada.”152  Instead, the court found South Portland’s ordinance 
did not impact several major sources of Canadian oil entering the city and, 
even if it did have an impact, such an argument “stretches the dormant 
Commerce Clause too far” and would be contrary to Exxon.153  The court 
held that, “in a modern globalized economy,” the fact that “commerce in a 
market originates in another state or country does not mean that otherwise 
evenhanded regulations or prohibitions on that market automatically have 
the ‘practical effect’ of discriminating against interstate or foreign 
commerce.”154 
In sum, the reasoning of the District of Maine in South Portland and 
the Oregon Court of Appeals in Portland is well-supported by U.S. 
Supreme Court precedent in Exxon.  Therefore, South Portland and 
Portland were correct to conclude that the fossil fuel shipping and storing 
ordinances at issue did not discriminate in effect. 
3. Fossil fuel restrictions do not have a discriminatory 
purpose when primarily based on environmental or 
health concerns 
The third kind of dormant Commerce Clause “discrimination” 
examined by some courts—including the district court in South Portland—
is “discriminatory purpose.”155  Courts often recite that strict scrutiny under 
 
148. Id. 
149. Portland Pipe Line Corp. v. City of South Portland, 332 F. Supp. 3d 264, 300–
01 (D. Me. 2018), appeal docketed, No. 18-02118 (1st Cir. Nov. 13, 2018). 
150. Id.  
151. Id. at 301.  
152. Id. at 302. 
153. Id. at 302–03.  
154. Id. 
155. See id. at 303–08. 
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the dormant Commerce Clause is triggered if a state or local law has a 
“discriminatory purpose.”156  However, courts rarely strike down a law 
based on “discriminatory purpose” alone.157  This has led some courts, 
including the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit and the U.S. 
District Court for the District of Maine in South Portland, to “question 
whether a showing of discriminatory purpose alone will invariably suffice 
to support a finding of constitutional invalidity under the dormant 
Commerce Clause.”158  Some courts omit the “discriminatory purpose” test 
altogether, as the court in Portland, Oregon did.159  
When courts do use the discriminatory purpose test, many have taken 
a restrained approach.  For example, the U.S. Supreme Court in Pike v. 
Bruce Church held that a lower level of scrutiny applies where the “primary 
purpose” is nondiscriminatory, and the “effects on interstate commerce are 
only incidental.”160  Citing Pike, the First Circuit held that heightened 
scrutiny is not triggered if the “potential discriminatory purpose [is] lurking 
in the background, [and] that purpose [is], at most, incidental to the primary 
purposes.”161 
In the context of environmental laws reviewed by the Supreme Court, 
a purported environmental purpose will not save a law from being deemed 
“discriminatory” if the law burdens only out-of-state products that pose no 
greater environmental or health risk than in-state products. 162  On the other 
 
156. E.g., Bacchus Imps. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 270–71 (1984).  
157. Courts that have overturned state or local laws on the basis of the law’s 
discrimination have not often done so without a finding of discriminatory effect or facial 
discrimination.  See id. at 268–71 (holding that a Hawaiian law exempting locally produced 
beverages from an alcohol tax that applied to non-local beverages had the discriminatory 
“purpose” of “aid[ing] Hawaiin industry” and also “seems clearly to discriminate on its 
face” and had the “effect” of discrimination); see also Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advert. 
Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 351–52 (1977) (noting “some indications” of intentional 
discrimination but holding the North Carolina law was discriminatory based on its 
“discriminatory impacts” or “effect of stripping away from the Washington apple industry 
the competitive and economic advantages it has earned . . . .”).  Indeed, the Supreme Court 
noted that “the principal focus of inquiry must be the practical operation of the statute . . . 
judged chiefly in terms of [its] probable effects.”  Lewis v. Bt Inv. Managers, 447 U.S. 27, 
37 (1980) (emphases added).  
158. All. of Auto. Mfrs. v. Gwadosky, 430 F.3d 30, 36 n.3 (1st Cir. 2005); City of 
South Portland, 332 F. Supp. 3d at 303 (citing All. of Auto. Mfrs., 430 F.3d at 36 n.3). 
159. See, e.g., City of Portland, 412 P.3d at 263 (explaining that the dormant 
Commerce Clause discrimination test is whether a law discriminates “on its face or in 
practical effect”). 
160. Pike v. Bruce Church, 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). 
161. All. of Auto. Mfrs. v. Gwadosky, 430 F.3d 30, 39 (1st Cir. 2005). 
162. See Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 149 (1986) (rejecting an argument that 
economic protectionism was evidenced by a government statement that Maine’s money 
would be better “spent at home” on “home-grown bait”).  For example, in Philadelphia v. 
New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978), the Court held that a New Jersey law, which had the 
6 - RACE_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/15/2019  3:50 PM 
Hastings Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 26, No. 1, Winter 2020 
 
104 
 
hand, where a law is designed to curtail fossil fuels that pose a greater 
environmental harm than other products, the Ninth Circuit has held that 
such laws do not have a discriminatory or “protectionist purpose;” rather, 
they are “genuinely proposed for environmental reasons,” even if some of 
the law’s supporters promote the law’s local economic benefits.163   
For example, the Ninth Circuit held in Rocky Mt. Farmers Union that 
the crude oil restrictions in California’s Low Carbon Fuel Standard did not 
have a discriminatory purpose, even though they were designed to 
“promote the development of alternative fuels rather than to encourage . . . 
crude oil” and the restrictions partially correlated with location.164  
Moreover, the district court on remand also found the Fuel Standard’s 
ethanol provisions did not have a “protectionist purpose,” even though a 
state agency press release touted that “[p]roduction of fuels within the state 
will also keep consumer dollars local by reducing the need to make fuel 
purchases from beyond its borders.”165  The court found that, at most, the 
statement was an “economic defense of a [regulation] genuinely proposed 
for environmental reasons.”166  The Ninth Circuit reached the same 
conclusion when examining Oregon’s low carbon fuel standard and 
statements by Oregon’s governor touting the law’s local economic 
benefits.167  These holdings are consistent with the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
decision in Maine v. Taylor, where the Court upheld Maine’s ban on certain 
out-of-state fish and rejected an argument that economic protectionism was 
 
purpose of protecting the state’s environment, health and safety, was facially discriminatory, 
not because of the law’s environmental purpose, but because it expressly barred only out-
of-state waste, which posed no greater risk than in-state waste.  The Court acknowledged 
that “slowing the flow of all waste” would be permissible under a long line of cases 
upholding quarantine laws that blocked “noxious” products at state borders.  Id. at 627–29. 
163. See Rocky Mt. Farmers Union, 730 F.3d 1070, 1100 n.13 (9th Cir. 2013) 
(holding that an “economic defense of a [regulation] genuinely proposed for environmental 
reasons” is not evidence of a “discriminatory purpose”); Am. Fuel & Petrochemical Mfrs. 
v. O’Keeffe, 903 F.3d 903, 912 (9th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 2043 (2019) (holding 
that statements by state government officials promoting the local economic benefits of the 
law “do not plausibly relate to a discriminatory design and are easily understood, in context, 
as economic defense of a regulation genuinely proposed for environmental reasons”); see 
also Rocky Mt. Farmers Union v. Corey, 258 F. Supp. 3d 1134, 1156 (E.D. Cal. 2017) 
(dismissing the assertion that discriminatory purpose was evidenced by a government 
statement that an environmental law would help “keep consumer dollars local”). 
164. Rocky Mt. Farmers Union, 730 F.3d at 1085, 1099–1101. 
165. Rocky Mt. Farmers Union, 258 F. Supp. 3d 1134, 1156.  
166. Id. (emphasis added) (citing Rocky Mt. Farmers Union, 730 F.3d at 1100 n.13 
(quoting Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 463 n. 7 (1981))). 
167. Am. Fuel & Petrochemical Mfrs., 903 F.3d at 912. 
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evidenced by a government statement saying Maine’s money would be 
better “spent at home” on “home-grown bait.”168 
Similarly, the U.S. District Court for the District of Maine in South 
Portland correctly held that that the City’s ordinance did not have a 
discriminatory effect, where the ordinance’s “primary purpose” was 
nondiscriminatory, despite its design to block a specific kind of product 
(crude oil) that happened to come from out-of-state.169  The court ruled as 
such despite some private supporters of the law encouraging “stop[ping] 
out-of-state big oil” or “Canadian oil,” and one Councilmember proposing 
(but not receiving support) to include a distinction between American and 
Canadian oil.170  Instead, the court found the “handful of anti-Canadian 
comments and references to out-of-state interests . . . falls short of 
establishing that the Ordinance’s primary purpose was to disfavor out-of-
state competitors or to favor in-state competitors” when viewed in context 
of the “voluminous record” demonstrating the City’s focus on community’s 
“health and safety,” and “air quality, water quality, aesthetics, and 
redevelopment risks of crude oil loading in general.”171 
In sum, the result and reasoning in South Portland is consistent with 
the First Circuit, Ninth Circuit, and Supreme Court precedents discussed in 
the preceding paragraphs.  Moreover, these decisions demonstrates that, to 
the extent that local laws must be subjected to a “discriminatory purpose” 
test under the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine, fossil fuel restrictions 
with genuine and primary environmental and health purposes are not 
discriminatory in purpose, even if some of the law’s supporters tout 
purposes that could be considered discriminatory or protectionist.  
However, the decisions discussed in this Subsection have also 
demonstrated that the “discriminatory purpose” test may no longer be 
necessary and, therefore, the Oregon Court of Appeals was not out-of-line 
when it ignored this issue altogether. 
B. Fossil Fuel Restrictions can Withstand the Pike Test and 
Strict Scrutiny  
The preceding Section demonstrated how fossil fuel regulations can 
be found “non-discriminatory” under a dormant Commerce Clause analysis 
and how the courts in Portland and South Portland correctly found the 
 
168. Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 149 (1986) (quoting United States v. Taylor, 
752 F.2d 757, 760 (1st Cir. 1985)) (the Court in Maine v. Taylor found that Maine’s law 
was facially discriminatory but did not find the law had a discriminatory purpose, and the 
Court ultimately upheld Maine’s law under a strict scrutiny standard). 
169. Portland Pipe Line Corp. v. City of South Portland, 332 F. Supp. 3d 264, 303–
04 (D. Me. 2018), appeal docketed, No. 18-2118 (1st Cir. filed Nov. 13, 2018). 
170. Id. 
171. Id. at 304. 
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fossil fuel handling and storing ordinances in those cases to be 
nondiscriminatory.172  This Section discusses the next step in a court’s 
dormant Commerce Clause analysis—determining what level of judicial 
scrutiny applies and whether the law at issue can withstand that scrutiny. 
If a state or local law does not “discriminate” against out-of-state 
commerce, but rather “regulates even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate 
local public interest and its effects on interstate commerce are only 
incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce 
is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.”173  Local and 
“[s]tate laws frequently survive this Pike scrutiny,”174 including the fossil 
fuel restrictions in South Portland, Maine175 and Portland, Oregon.176  In 
contrast to the relatively light scrutiny placed on nondiscriminatory laws, 
there is a “virtually per se rule of invalidity”177 for discriminatory laws.  
Even so, discriminatory laws may still survive if they “serve[] a legitimate 
local purpose” that “could not be served as well by available 
nondiscriminatory means,” even if the risks are “imperfectly understood” 
and even if the proposed solution would not be a “complete success.”178  
Therefore, if a court rules consistently with the prior Section’s 
premise that local restrictions on fossil fuel handling and storing should 
generally be deemed nondiscriminatory, those restrictions can typically 
survive the Pike test.  However, even if a court found a local restriction on 
fossil fuel handling and storing to be discriminatory, this Section argues 
that the Supreme Court’s precedent in Maine v. Taylor may nevertheless 
allow the local law’s survival.179 
In Maine v. Taylor, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a facially 
discriminatory law may survive strict scrutiny where the state seeks to 
“guard[] against imperfectly understood environmental risks, despite the 
possibility that they may ultimately prove to be negligible.”180  In 
supporting its rare decision to uphold a facially discriminatory law—which 
 
172. See infra Section III.A.  
173. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).  
174. Dep’t of Revenue v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 339 (2008) (citing Pike, 397 U.S. 
137); see also Am. Fuel & Petrochemical Mfrs. v. O’Keeffe, 903 F.3d 903, 916 (9th Cir. 
2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 2043 (2019) (holding that Oregon’s low carbon fuel standard 
survived the Pike test in “in light of the substantial state interest in mitigating the 
environmental effects of greenhouse gas emissions …”).  
175. City of South Portland, 332 F. Supp. 3d at 308. 
176. Columbia Pac. Bldg. Trades Council v. City of Portland, 412 P.3d 258, 266 (Or. 
Ct. App.), cert. denied, 434 P.3d 29 (Or. 2018). 
177. Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978). 
178. Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 138–51 (1986) (citations omitted). 
179. For a similar argument made with respect to California’s Low Carbon Fuel 
Standard, see Lee, supra note 111, at 65. 
180. Maine, 477 U.S. at 148.  
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banned the importation of live baitfish from other states—the Court 
reasoned that Maine’s desire to protect its fisheries from parasites and non-
native species was a “legitimate interest.”181  Further, there was no non-
discriminatory means to achieve this goal because “there was no 
satisfactory way to inspect shipments of live baitfish for parasites or 
commingled species.”182  The Court explained that the “commerce clause 
cannot be read as requiring [a state] to sit idly by and wait until potentially 
irreversible environmental damage has occurred . . . before it acts to avoid 
such consequences.”183  Therefore, Maine v. Taylor paved the way for 
courts to uphold local fossil fuel shipping and handling bans against 
dormant Commerce Clause challenges when those bans aim to combat 
“irreversible environmental damage,” such as long-term human health 
effects and climate change, and there is no feasible or “satisfactory way” 
besides a ban to achieve that goal.  For example, the overwhelming risk of 
climate change or the long-term human health risks of fine particulate 
matter—which governments, health organizations, courts, and the trucking 
industry alike concede is harmful at any level184—could be deemed the kind 
of irreversible environmental harm which nothing less than a ban would 
satisfactorily address. 
Even though Portland, Oregon and South Portland, Maine were 
decided under the Pike balancing test, the courts arguably could have 
reached the same conclusions under a strict scrutiny standard, using the 
logic of Maine v. Taylor.  For example, in South Portland, the court held 
that the City’s ordinance prohibiting crude oil loading did “not impose 
burdens on foreign and interstate commerce that are clearly excessive in 
relation to the putative local benefits.”185  The court found that although the 
ordinance “creates meaningful burdens on interstate and foreign 
commerce,”186 it also created “ample and weighty local benefits” by 
addressing “air emissions-related public health risks” for adjacent 
“sensitive locations, such as schools,” as well as noise, odor, and other 
environmental risks from loading crude oil.187  As evidence of the 
significant risks imposed by the project, the court was influenced by the 
fact that the American Lung Association gave the county a “C” air quality 
grade, even though the state’s Department of Environmental Protection 
 
181. Id. at 150. 
182. Id. at 141. 
183. Id. at 148. 
184. See infra notes 273-274 and accompanying discussion. 
185. Portland Pipe Line Corp. v. City of South Portland, 332 F. Supp. 3d 264, 308 
(D. Me. 2018), appeal docketed, No. 18-2118 (1st Cir. filed Nov. 13, 2018). 
186. Id. at 309. 
187. Id. at 310. 
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found the air quality to be acceptable.188  In addition, because the court was 
persuaded by the unrebutted testimony that “there is no safe level of 
exposure to many of the air pollutants that would be emitted,”189 less-
restrictive means would not achieve the city’s goal of protecting air quality.  
The court rebuffed the plaintiff’s assertion that the ordinance’s benefits 
were inflated because it does not address other sources of local pollution.  
Instead, the South Portland court said that “a legislature need not strike at 
all evils at the same time or in the same way, and [] a legislature may . . . 
adopt[] regulations that only partially ameliorate a perceived evil,”190 
echoing the Maine v. Taylor holding that a local law need not guarantee 
“complete success.”191 
Likewise, in Portland, Oregon, the court’s ruling in the city’s favor 
purportedly relied on Pike deference—finding the plaintiff had not proven 
that an absence of large fossil fuel terminals in the city would excessively 
burden interstate commerce.192  And, like in South Portland, the Portland 
decision could also be upheld under the scrutiny of Maine v. Taylor.  The 
court in Portland, Oregon recognized that the City’s ordinance would 
provide “legitimate putative local benefits which include limiting the 
number of very large fossil fuel terminals in a moderate-to-high earthquake 
liquefaction zone,” as well as “reduc[ing] the risk of potential explosions, 
accidents, and fire at large fossil fuel terminal,” and “reduc[ing] the similar 
risk of catastrophic accident from the larger trains that transport fossil fuels 
to the terminals.”193  Opponents could maybe argue that seismic safety 
goals could be achieved through other technological means and therefore 
the ordinance should not survive strict scrutiny.  However, it’s unclear if 
such technology exists or would be less restrictive than Portland’s simpler 
size-based restriction.  
In sum, while the specific outcome will be fact-dependent, Maine v. 
Taylor, Portland, and South Portland demonstrate that there is room for 
bans on fossil fuel shipping, handling, and storing to survive a strict 
scrutiny dormant Commerce Clause test.  
 
188. Id. at 312. 
189. Id. 
190. Id. (quoting Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 466 
(1981)). 
191. Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 151 (1986). 
192. Columbia Pac. Bldg. Trades Council v. City of Portland, 412 P.3d 258, 267 (Or. 
Ct. App.), cert. denied, 434 P.3d 29 (Or. 2018). 
193. Id. at 266. 
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C. Restrictions on Handling and Storing Fossil Fuels Do Not 
Regulate “Extraterritorially” 
Some challengers to state and local fossil fuel restrictions—including 
the plaintiffs in Portland and South Portland—have argued that such laws 
violate the doctrine against extraterritoriality.194  A law is per se invalid 
under the “extraterritoriality” doctrine if the law, “either by its express 
terms or by its inevitable effect,”195 “control[s] commerce occurring wholly 
outside the boundaries of a State”196 or “project[s] its legislation” into 
another state.197  Because the Supreme Court has “rarely held that statutes 
violate the extraterritoriality doctrine,”198 scholars have observed that the 
“contours of the doctrine” are not “fully articulated” and are “unsettled and 
poorly understood,” leading to inconsistent interpretation among lower 
courts. 199  Therefore, the applicability of the extraterritoriality doctrine to 
port fossil fuel restrictions is best understood through a series of case 
examples. 
The Tenth Circuit—in an opinion authored by now Supreme Court 
Justice Gorsuch—upheld Colorado’s Renewable [Energy] Portfolio 
Standard200 against a challenge under the extraterritoriality prong of the 
dormant Commerce Clause, despite the fact that the law “effectively means 
some out-of-state coal producers . . . will lose business.”201  The court in 
 
194. Id. at 265; Portland Pipe Line Corp. v. City of South Portland, 332 F. Supp. 3d 
264, 292–92 (D. Me. 2018), appeal docketed, No. 18-2118 (1st Cir. filed Nov. 13, 2018). 
195. Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 644, 669 (2003) (finding 
that a Maine statute that placed requirements on drug manufactures, but not on pharmacies, 
did not extraterritorially regulate when it did “not regulate the price of any out-of-state 
transaction . . . .  Maine does not insist that manufacturers sell their drugs to a wholesaler 
for a certain price,” nor did it tie “the price of its in-state products to out-of-state prices,” 
nor could a manufacturer “avoid its rebate obligation by opening production facilities in 
Maine . . . .”). 
196. Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 336–37 (1989) (striking down a Connecticut 
law that required in-state beer prices to be no higher than out-of-state prices, which had the 
effect of controlling prices outside of the state). 
197. Baldwin v. G. A. F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 521 (1935) (invalidating a New 
York law that extended its minimum milk prices beyond its borders by forbidding the in-
state sale of milk that was purchased out-of-state below the minimum price).  But, as 
explained above in note 101, courts sometimes treat extraterritoriality as branch under the 
strict scrutiny/discrimination branch, rather than its own branch.  
198. Rocky Mt. Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070, 1101 (9th Cir. 2013); see 
also Energy & Env’t Legal Inst. v. Epel, 793 F.3d 1169, 1172 (10th Cir. 2015) (calling the 
extraterritoriality doctrine the “most dormant” of dormant Commerce Clauses tests).  
199. Gellerson, supra note 36, at 569, 580. 
200. The Renewable Portfolio Standard “requires electricity generators to ensure that 
20 percent of the electricity they sell to Colorado consumers comes from renewable 
sources.”  Energy & Env’t Legal Inst. v. Epel, 793 F.3d 1169, 1170 (10th Cir. 2015). 
201. Id. at 1171. 
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Energy & Env’t Legal Inst. v. Epel held that the extraterritoriality doctrine 
only applies where “three essential characteristics” are present: “(1) a price 
control or price affirmation regulation, (2) linking in-state prices to those 
charged elsewhere, with (3) the effect of raising costs for out-of-state 
consumers or rival businesses.”202  The court concluded that these elements 
were not met, because the Standard did not “blatantly” regulate price, nor 
did it “discriminate” against out-of-state consumers or producers, even 
though it could have “ripple effects, including price effects, both in-state 
and elsewhere,” and “hurt” fossil fuel businesses.203  The court  reasoned 
that Colorado’s law “does not discriminate”204 because it would equally 
harm all fossil fuel producers and equally help all renewable energy 
producers, regardless of location.205  The court also cautioned against 
“overinclusion” in applying the extraterritoriality doctrine, warning that “if 
any state regulation that ‘control[s] . . . conduct’ out of state is per se 
unconstitutional,” the court would “have to strike down state health and 
safety regulations that require out-of-state manufacturers to alter their 
designs or labels[.]”206 
Similarly, the Ninth Circuit held that California’s Low Carbon Fuel 
Standard was not an “extraterritorial regulation,” because it only applied to 
fuels consumed in-state and was “properly based . . . on the harmful 
properties of fuel.”207  The court reasoned that “[t]he Commerce Clause 
does not protect [a business’s] ability to make others pay for the hidden 
harms of their products merely because those products are shipped across 
state lines.”208  Moreover, even if California had the “goal of influencing 
the out-of-state choices of market participants,” it was free to do so by 
“regulat[ing] commerce and contracts within [its] boundaries.”209  The 
court found that California’s Fuel Standard did not impose mandates on 
“wholly out-of-state transactions.”210  Rather, the Fuel Standard allowed 
businesses “in any location [to] elect to respond to the incentives,” without 
requiring businesses to “meet a particular carbon intensity standard” (they 
could purchase carbon credits to meet the standard), and without requiring 
any jurisdiction to “adopt a particular regulatory standard for its producers 
 
202. Id. at 1173. 
203. Id. at 1173–74. 
204. Id. at 1173.  
205. Id. at 1174. 
206. Id. at 1175. 
207. Rocky Mt. Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070, 1101–04 (9th Cir. 2013).  
208. Id. at 1106. 
209. Id. at 1103 (emphasis added) (citing Pharm. Research & Mfrs. Of Am. v. Walsh, 
538 U.S. 644, 679 (2003)).  
210. Rocky Mt. Farmers Union, 730 F.3d at 1101.  
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to gain access to California.”211  Further, the Fuel Standard “makes no effort 
to ensure the price of [fuel] is lower in California than in other states.”212  
On these same grounds, the Ninth Circuit also recently found Oregon’s low 
carbon fuel standard did not regulate extraterritorially.213 
In contrast, the Eighth Circuit upheld a district court ruling 
overturning a Minnesota law, which had essentially banned new coal 
generation in the state’s electricity market.214  The district court had found 
Minnesota’s law was unconstitutional on the grounds that it was 
extraterritorial regulation.215  However, only one out of three judges on the 
panel found the law violated the dormant Commerce Clause, while the 
other two found the law was preempted by federal statutes.216  Further, one 
of the judges disagreed with the overly broad application of the 
extraterritoriality doctrine, explaining that there is a “distinction between 
[impermissible] wholly extraterritorial regulation and [permissible] 
regulations which apply to out of state companies entering into commerce 
within a state,” and concluding that the law did not control conduct wholly 
outside of the state.217  Therefore, the Eight Circuit’s splintered decision 
should not be seen as a gateway to expansive use of the extraterritoriality 
doctrine against environmental laws. 
Consistent with the Ninth and Tenth Circuit decisions described 
above, the court in Portland, Oregon concluded that Portland’s ordinance 
limiting the size of fossil fuel terminals did “not regulate the conduct of 
out-of-state consumers in Oregon, nor do they regulate out-of-state 
consumers’ conduct in their states.”218  Likewise, the South Portland, 
Maine court held that the City’s ordinance “prohibit[ing] crude oil within 
the boundaries of certain districts in the City” was not an extraterritorial 
regulation because “[c]onduct is not controlled by the Ordinance if it occurs 
 
211. Id.  
212. Id. at 1103.  
213. Am. Fuel & Petrochemical Mfrs. v. O’Keeffe, 903 F.3d 903, 916–917 (9th Cir. 
2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 2043 (2019). 
214. North Dakota v. Heydinger, 825 F.3d 912 (8th Cir. 2016). 
215. Id. at 913–914 (discussing North Dakota v. Heydinger, 15 F. Supp. 3d 891, 919 
(D. Minn. 2014)); see also Gellerson, supra note 36, at 589–90 (describing North Dakota v. 
Heydinger, 825 F.3d 912 (8th Cir. 2016)).  
216. See North Dakota, 825 F.3d at 913 (Loken, J.); id. at 924 (Murphy, J., 
concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (asserting the law is preempted by the 
Federal Power Act); id. 927 (Colloton, J., concurring in judgement) (asserting the state law 
conflicts with the Clean Air Act); see also Gellerson, supra note 36, at 590–593. 
217. North Dakota, 825 F.3d at 925 (Murphy, J. concurring in part and concurring 
in judgement).  
218. Columbia Pac. Bldg. Trades Council v. City of Portland, 412 P.3d 258, 266 (Or. 
Ct. App.), cert. denied, 434 P.3d 29 (Or. 2018) (the court did not expressly use the term 
“extraterritoriality”). 
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outside . . . South Portland’s Shipyard, Commercial, and Industrial 
districts.”219  Further, petroleum companies “would not be subject to 
inconsistent obligations if other localities passed similar statutes . . . . 
[T]here would simply be a smaller list of potential sites for loading crude 
oil.”220  Moreover, even though the likely “effect of [South Portland’s] 
Ordinance is to influence . . . infrastructure outside the City” because it 
could hurt the plaintiff’s ability to obtain financing for a pipeline, the court 
concluded “that does not mean the Ordinance regulates 
extraterritorially.”221  In reasoning reminiscent of Justice Gorsuch’s 
warning against “overinclusion,”222 the South Portland court cautioned 
against using extraterritorial effect to strike down laws, because if effect 
alone were enough, then “in the modern age of highly interconnected 
commerce, there would be virtually no room for local historic police 
powers.”223 
In sum, the bounds and applicability of the extraterritoriality doctrine 
are ill-defined.  But to the extent that challengers to a port fossil fuel ban 
raise extraterritoriality concerns, Portland and South Portland, as well as 
the Ninth and Tenth Circuit cases discussed above, demonstrate that courts 
have room to conclude such bans do impermissibly regulate 
extraterritorially. 
D. Dormant Foreign Commerce Clause 
An additional dormant Commerce Clause issue in the context of port 
communities restricting fossil fuels is that of the dormant foreign 
Commerce Clause, or the “federal government’s ability to speak with one 
voice when regulating commerce with foreign governments.”224  Plaintiffs 
 
219. Portland Pipe Line Corp. v. City of South Portland, 332 F. Supp. 3d 264, 297 
(D. Me. 2018), appeal docketed, No. 18-2118 (1st Cir. filed Nov. 13, 2018). 
220. Id. 
221. Id. 
222. Energy & Env’t Legal Inst. v. Epel, 793 F.3d 1169, 1175 (10th Cir. 2015) 
(warning that “if any state regulation that ‘control[s] . . . conduct’ out of state is per se 
unconstitutional, wouldn’t we have to strike down state health and safety regulations that 
require out-of-state manufacturers to alter their designs or labels?”). 
223. City of South Portland, 332 F. Supp. 3d at 297. 
224. Id. at 314–15 (citing e.g., Japan Line, Ltd. v. Los Angeles Cty., 441 U.S. 434, 
449 (1979)). 
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raised this issue in Oakland225 and the Longview, Washington case,226 and 
the court addressed this issue in South Portland, Maine.227 
In South Portland, the court concluded the city’s ordinance did not 
“interfere with the government’s ability to ‘speak with one voice’ when 
regulating foreign commerce or impair[] uniformity in an area where 
federal uniformity is essential.”228  Despite the fact that the ordinance 
barred mostly Canadian-oil, the ordinance did “not explicitly target any 
foreign countries.”229  Further, “[e]ven if enacted in many other 
jurisdictions, there will be no inconsistent burdens” or “perplexing 
disuniformity, it is simply unfavorable uniformity.”230  The court reasoned 
that “[a]ny local regulation or prohibition on a large and important industry 
will inevitably touch on federal commerce in a broad sense, given the 
realities of a modern globalized society,” and the mere fact that an 
ordinance has “foreign resonances because it impacts a piece of cross-
border infrastructure and a large industry” does not put it in conflict with 
the Commerce Clause.231  
Therefore, just as South Portland demonstrated that local bans on 
fossil fuel handling, storing, and shipping can survive dormant Commerce 
Clause tests for discrimination and extraterritorially, it also demonstrated 
that such bans can survive dormant foreign Commerce Clause Challenges.  
IV.  Salt Lake City’s and Oakland’s Ordinances are Well 
within the Bounds of the Dormant Commerce Clause 
Jurisprudence 
The previous Part of this Article demonstrated that local restrictions 
on fossil fuel handling at ports are not inherently discriminatory, do not 
inherently regulate extraterritoriality, do not impermissibly regulate foreign 
commerce, and could survive a stricter scrutiny test.  Part IV now applies 
this precedent to the ordinances in Oakland, California and Salt Lake City, 
 
225. Complaint at ¶¶10, 130, 132, 158, 166, Oakland, Oakland Bulk & Oversized 
Terminal, LLC v. City of Oakland, 321 F. Supp. 3d 986, 988–89 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (No. 
3:16-vc-07014-MEJ), appeal docketed, OBOT v. City of Oakland, No. 18-16141 (9th Cir. 
filed June 20, 2018).  
226. Complaint at ¶¶224-239, Lighthouse Resources Inc. v. Inslee, No. 3:18-cv-
05005 (W.D. Wash. filed Jan. 3, 2018) (claiming relief under the dormant Foreign 
Commerce Clause, alleging the state discriminated against the plaintiff’s “efforts to export 
coal to their Asian customers” and created “substantial risk of conflict with foreign 
governments”).  
227. City of South Portland, 332 F. Supp. 3d at 313–14.  
228. Id. at 316. 
229. Id. at 314. 
230. Id. at 315. 
231. Id. at 315–316. 
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Utah, and concludes that both fit comfortably within the bounds of the 
dormant Commerce Clause.  
A. Oakland’s and Salt Lake’s Ordinances are Not 
Discriminatory on Their Face, In Effect, or In Purpose 
This Section subjects Oakland’s and Salt Lake City’s ordinances to 
the three tests of dormant Commerce Clause discrimination discussed in 
Part III—discrimination on the face of the law, in-effect, and in purpose—
and concludes these ordinance are nondiscriminatory under each test. 
1. Oakland’s and Salt Lake’s ordinances are not 
“facially discriminatory” 
Applying the principles of Philadelphia v. New Jersey,232 Portland, 
Oregon,233 and South Portland, Maine,234 the ordinances in Oakland and 
Salt Lake do not facially discriminate.  Salt Lake City’s ordinance does not 
base its natural resources restrictions on geographic origin, but rather on 
the size of storage area, type of fuel, or type of industry or product.235  This 
echoes—albeit in a much less-restrictive way—Portland, Oregon’s 
ordinance barring fossil fuel facilities over a certain size.236  Similarly, 
Oakland’s ordinance does not prohibit coal from a specific locality, but 
rather prohibits coal from any location from being stored or handled “at 
bulk goods facilities in Oakland.”237  This mirrors South Portland, Maine’s 
prohibition on crude oil loading in certain city zones.238  Therefore, courts 
examining Oakland’s and Salt Lake City’s ordinances should follow the 
logic of the two Portland cases and find no facial discrimination, because 
the ordinances apply “with equal force to any entity seeking to load [coal 
or crude oil]” in the regulated zones and they “bind[] local entities to the 
 
232. Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624–29 (holding that New Jersey’s 
law was facially discriminatory because it barred out-of-state waste on the basis of 
geographic origin alone, and out-of-state waste posed no greater threat than in-state waste). 
233. Columbia Pac. Bldg. Trades Council v. City of Portland, 412 P.3d 258, 263 (Or. 
Ct. App.), cert. denied, 434 P.3d 29 (Or. 2018); see also supra Part III.A.1. 
234. City of South Portland, 332 F. Supp. 3d 264; see also supra Part III.A.1. 
235. SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH, CODE § 21A.34.150(E)(1) (Sterling Codifiers through 
June 11, 2019) (placing restrictions on “natural resource and bulk material storage in excess 
of five hundred (500) square feet in area”); id. at § (E)(1)(b) (placing more restrictions on 
the coal, coal byproducts, and crude oil); id. at § (B)(2)(f) (prohibiting any extractive 
industry, waste incinerator, hazardous waste storage or processor, refinery of petroleum 
products). 
236. City of Portland, 412 P.3d at 263. 
237. Oakland Bulk & Oversized Terminal, LLC v. City of Oakland, 321 F. Supp. 3d 
986, 991 (N.D. Cal. 2018), appeal docketed, No. 18-16141 (9th Cir. June 20, 2018). 
238. City of South Portland, 332 F. Supp. 3d at 282–84. 
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same extent as entities based . . . outside the state.”239  Further, even if the 
Oakland and Salt Lake ordinances did place more restrictions on fossil fuels 
coming from out-of-state, it is still possible for a court to apply the Ninth 
Circuit’s standard and find no discrimination, so long as the out-of-state 
fuels impose greater harm on the city than locally produced fuels, and the 
additional restrictions are proportional to the harm.240 
2. Oakland’s and Salt Lake’s ordinances arguably do 
not discriminate in effect, but more facts are needed 
Applying the principles of Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland,241 
Portland, Oregon, and South Portland, Maine, a court should find that 
Oakland’s and Salt Lake’s ordinances do not discriminate in practical 
effect.  In Oakland, the plaintiff’s complaint has the same two flaws as the 
complaints in Portland and South Portland: (1) a lack of competition 
between substantially similar in-state and out-of-state entities; and (2) 
alleged harm only to local entities.242 
First, the Oakland ordinance does not discriminate between 
substantially similar in-state and out-of-state entities.  The Oakland 
plaintiff claims that the City’s ordinance discriminates against “out-of-state 
miners, shippers, customers, and carriers of coal . . . while protecting in-
state interests by banning the transportation of coal . . . and simultaneously 
exempting from the ban certain local, non-commercial and on-site 
manufacturing operations within Oakland that handle, store, and/or 
consume coal.”243  Similar to the exemptions in Portland, Oregon’s 
ordinance,244 the local consumers exempted from the Oakland ban are not 
“substantially similar entities” to the out-of-state miners, shippers, or 
carriers allegedly harmed.245  
 
239. Id. at 300. 
240. Am. Fuel &Petrochemical Mfrs. v. O’Keeffe, 903 F.3d 903 (9th Cir. 2018), 
cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 2043 (2019) (finding Oregon’s fuel standard was not facially 
discriminatory); see Rocky Mt. Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070, 1089 (9th Cir. 
2013) (holding California’s Fuel Standard was not facially discriminatory, where 
differential treatment of local and nonlocal fuel was based on carbon intensity).  
241. Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Md., 437 U.S. 117 (1978). 
242. See City of South Portland, 332 F. Supp. 3d at 300–03; see also City of Portland, 
412 P.3d at 262. 
243. Complaint, Document 1 at ¶131, Oakland Bulk & Oversized Terminal, LLC v. 
City of Oakland, 321 F. Supp. 3d 986 (N.D. Cal. 2018), appeal docketed, No. 18-16141 (9th 
Cir. filed June 20, 2018) (No. 3:16-cv-07014-VC). 
244. See City of Portland, 412 P.3d at 264 (holding that “sellers” and “users” of fossil 
fuels are not “substantially similar entities” for a dormant Commerce Clause comparison). 
245. The facilities exempted in Oakland’s ban include: “(i) Non-commercial 
facilities (e.g. educational facilities or residential property on which persons may Store or 
Handle small amounts of Coal or Coke for personal, scientific, recreational, or incidental 
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Second, Oakland’s ordinance only allegedly harms local entities. The 
harm claimed in Oakland is the loss of money by the defendant (City of 
Oakland) and by the plaintiff, which is a California corporation.246  
Therefore, as the South Portland court concluded, “[t]he Ordinance cannot 
be said to favor in-state commercial interests at the expense of out-of-state 
competitors when the entities most directly harmed by the practical effects 
of the Ordinance are in-state, local businesses.”247  Further, the Oakland 
plaintiff’s allegation of harm to out-of-state customers, as well as harm 
alleged to out-of-state producers, is undermined by the fact that “18 months 
after the Ordinance was enacted, the coal trains that ran through Oakland 
before then [to the neighboring Port of Richmond] have continued to do 
so.”248  Moreover, even if there was harm to out-of-state coal producers, the 
ordinance applies equally to coal from any location.  As the court in South 
Portland, Maine noted, the fact that “commerce in a market originates in 
another state or country does not mean that otherwise evenhanded 
regulations or prohibitions on that market automatically have the ‘practical 
effect’ of discriminating against interstate or foreign commerce.”249  
Therefore, like in South Portland, a court has ample room to find that 
Oakland’s ordinance does not discriminate in-effect. 
Similarly, for Salt Lake City’s ordinance, challengers would have a 
difficult time overcoming the fact that the entities most likely to be directly 
economically harmed by the City’s standards on coal, crude oil, and 
extractive industries250 are Utah-based companies.  In fact, the State of 
Utah’s official objectives for the Utah Inland Port include fostering the 
“export [of] Utah products” and “connect[ing] local businesses to potential 
foreign markets for exportation.”251  Challengers could argue that the 
ordinance might disproportionately burden out-of-state purchasers as 
compared to in-state purchasers, because Utah products going through the 
Inland Port are likely intended for out-of-state markets—such as those in 
Oakland, California or Longview, Washington—whereas Utah products 
 
use) and (ii) on-site manufacturing facilities where all of the Coal or Coke is consumed on-
site at that facility’s location and used on-site as an integral component in a production 
process . . . .”  City of Oakland, Cal., Ordinance 13385, § 8.60.040(C) (July 20, 2016). 
246. Complaint, Document 1 at ¶14, ¶122, Oakland Bulk & Oversized Terminal, 
LLC, 321 F. Supp. 3d 986 (No. 3:16-cv-07014-VC). 
247. City of South Portland, 332 F. Supp. 3d at 301. 
248. Intervenor-Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgement, Document 156 at 
14:10-19, Oakland Bulk & Oversized Terminal, LLC, 321 F. Supp. 3d 986 (No. 3:16-cv-
07014-VC) (citing the Declaration of OBOT’s owner, Mr. Tagami).  
249. City of South Portland, 332 F. Supp. 3d at 302. 
250. SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH, CODE §§ 21A.34.150(E)(1)(b), B(2)(f) (Sterling 
Codifiers through June 11, 2019).   
251. UTAH CODE ANN. § 11-58-203 (West, Westlaw through 2019 General Session) 
(emphases added). 
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going to in-state markets may be less likely to travel through the Inland Port 
and thus would not be impacted by the Ordinance.  Challengers may also 
point to the Ordinance’s exemption for “[t]he outdoor storage of bulk 
materials necessary for safety purposes, such as the storage of de-icing 
materials used on public streets”252 as a benefit to purely local consumers.  
However, it is uncertain if the specific kinds of in-state and out-of-
state purchasers that a challenger to Salt Lake City’s ordinance might 
discuss would be “substantially similar” for a dormant Commerce Clause 
comparison.253  And, even if those purchasers were substantially similar, 
challengers would need to prove Salt Lake’s ordinance caused Utah coal to 
become more expensive out-of-state.  Given that Utah coal can simply 
circumvent the Inland Port to ship to out-of-state markets, which it 
currently does,254 it is unclear if the City’s restrictions would result in any 
differences between in-state and out-of-state prices of Utah coal and if a 
price differential would be anything other than a permissible “incidental” 
effect of an otherwise “evenhanded[]” law,255 “based on the real risks 
posed.”256  Therefore, depending on the specific facts, a court may follow 
South Portland’s conclusion that challenges to Salt Lake City’s ordinance 
“stretch[] the dormant Commerce Clause too far.”257 
3. Oakland’s and Salt Lake’s ordinances are properly 
based on environmental health concerns and do not 
have a discriminatory purpose 
A court should almost certainly find that Oakland’s or Salt Lake 
City’s ordinances do not have a discriminatory purpose, in light of the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Maine v. Taylor and the Ninth Circuit rulings 
on California’s and Oregon’s low carbon fuel standards.258  These decisions 
demonstrate that laws which are designed to curtail a harmful product do 
 
252. SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH, CODE § 21A.34.150(E)(1)(c) (Sterling Codifiers 
through June 11, 2019). 
253. See Gen. Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 297-303 (1997) (holding that 
natural gas “bundled with [. . .] services and protections” and sold to local consumers by 
utilities did not compete with “unbundled” natural gas sold by independent marketers to 
high-volume industrial buyers). 
254. ADVANCING UTAH COAL, supra note 68, at 9 (“14.6 percent of Utah’s [coal] 
production went to other states and roughly 5 percent went to foreign countries” in 2015).  
255. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). 
256. Am. Fuel & Petrochemical Mfrs. v. O’Keeffe, 903 F.3d 903, 914–17 (9th Cir. 
2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 2043 (2019) (holding Oregon’s low carbon fuel standard did 
not discriminate in effect because different treatment between in-state and out-of-state fuels 
was based on carbon intensity, not geography). 
257. Portland Pipe Line Corp. v. City of South Portland, 332 F. Supp. 3d 264, 302 
(D. Me. 2018), appeal docketed, No. 18-02118 (1st Cir. Nov. 13, 2018). 
258. See supra Part III.A.3. 
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not have a discriminatory purpose if proposed for environmental reasons, 
even if some of the laws’ supporters promote the local economic benefits, 
unless other clearly discriminatory factors are present.259  
The express purpose of Oakland’s ordinance is to “address the unique 
and peculiar health, safety, and/or other impacts of Coal” in a community 
that has “populations most vulnerable to health impacts from air 
pollutants.”260  These goals and concerns were echoed by community 
groups.261  Likewise, the express purpose of Salt Lake City’s ordinance is 
to “facilitate[] regional, national, and international trade,” while also 
aiming to be a “model to the nation for sustainable development,” 
“respect[] and maintain[] sensitivity to the natural environment,” “help[] to 
achieve City and State goals for air and water quality,” and “avoid, 
minimize, manage, and mitigate detrimental environmental impacts.”262  
The public263 and the local school district264 have echoed environmental and 
health concerns over the Inland Port that Salt Lake’s ordinance was 
 
259. See Am. Fuel & Petrochemical Mfrs. 903 F.3d at 912 (statements by state 
officials promoting the local economic benefits of the law “do not plausibly relate to a 
discriminatory design and are easily understood, in context, as economic defense of a 
regulation genuinely proposed for environmental reasons.”); Rocky Mt. Farmers Union v. 
Corey, 258 F. Supp. 3d 1134, 1156 (E.D. Cal. 2017) (dismissing assertion that 
discriminatory purpose was evidenced by government statement that the law would help 
“keep consumer dollars local”); Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 149 (1986) (rejecting an 
argument that economic protectionism was evidenced by a government statement saying 
Maine’s money would be better “spent at home”); see also Rocky Mt. Farmers Union, 730 
F.3d 1070, 1100 fn.13 (9th Cir. 2013) (“economic defense of a [regulation] genuinely 
proposed for environmental reasons” is not evidence of a “discriminatory purpose”); cf. 
Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 627–29 (1978) (wherein the Court held a New 
Jersey law, which had the purpose of protecting the state’s environment, health, and safety, 
was facially discriminatory because it expressly barred only out-of-state waste, which posed 
no greater risks than in-state waste.  The Court acknowledged that “slowing the flow of all 
waste” would be permissible under a line of cases upholding quarantine laws that blocked 
“noxious” products at state borders).  
260. City of Oakland, Cal., Ordinance 13385, § 8.60.010, § 8.6.020(B) (July 20, 
2016).  
261. Challenging Proposed Coal Export Terminal in Oakland, California, 
EARTHJUSTICE, https://perma.cc/3QHX-D8DN (“transporting and storing coal on the 
Oakland waterfront poses serious short- and long-term impacts on community health and 
the local environment”) (last visited Oct. 20, 2018).  
262. SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH, CODE § 21A.34.150 (A) (Sterling Codifiers through 
June 10, 2019).   
263. Taylor Stevens, How Will the Inland Port, a Massive Project Near the Great 
Salt Lake, Affect Air Quality and the Ecosystem?, SALT LAKE TRIB. (Oct. 21, 2018), 
https://perma.cc/AHL6-Q96Q (reporting that most public comments to the City Council and 
Port Board focused on environmental impacts).   
264. See, e.g., Glen Mills, Salt Lake City School District raises concerns about 
Inland Port, GOOD4UTAH (Sept. 11, 2018, 8:35 AM), https://perma.cc/X234-BWFC 
(describing traffic, noise pollution, and air quality concerns). 
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designed to regulate.  The fact that Salt Lake’s ordinance also aims to 
“minimize[] resource use” without regard for the geographic origin of those 
resources265 does not indicate any kind of discrimination recognized by 
dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence.  Further, even though Salt Lake 
City’s Mayor has been an outspoken critic of the state’s takeover of the Port 
area, her criticism has not questioned the commercial or interstate trade 
purposes of the Port.266  
Therefore, it would be easy for a court to recognize that the primary 
purposes of both Oakland’s and Salt Lake City’s restrictions are not 
geographical, but instead have to do with the impact caused by coal from 
any location on “the health and safety of [the] community,” just as the court 
in South Portland, Maine did.267  Moreover, like in South Portland,268 a 
court would be well-reasoned to conclude that Salt Lake City’s and 
Oakland’s ordinance are free from any discriminatory purpose under the 
dormant Commerce Clause. 
B. Oakland’s and Salt Lakes Ordinances Could Withstand 
Strict Scrutiny 
Even if Oakland’s and Salt Lake City’s health and safety-focused 
ordinances were found to be discriminatory, they could still survive.  The 
U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that the dormant Commerce Clause:  
 
does not elevate free trade above all other values. As long as a 
[local law] does not needlessly obstruct interstate trade or attempt 
to place itself in a position of economic isolation, it retains broad 
regulatory authority to protect the health and safety of its citizens 
and the integrity of its natural resources.269  
 
Courts would be well-reasoned to find that, under the precedent of 
Maine v. Taylor, the ordinances of Oakland and Salt Lake City “serve[] a 
legitimate local purpose” that “could not be served as well by available 
nondiscriminatory means” and thus should be upheld, even if the proposed 
 
265. SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH, CODE § 21A.34.150(A) (Sterling Codifiers through 
June 10, 2019). 
266. See, e.g., Katie McKellar, Salt Lake mayor calls for public’s help to guide port 
zoning, DESERET NEWS (Aug. 10, 2018), https://perma.cc/NEJ6-YA5N (quoting Mayor 
Biskupski as saying the city is “being forced” to meet an “arbitrary deadline,” and it is 
“troubling” that the state-created port authority can overturn city zoning decisions). 
267. Portland Pipe Line Corp. v. City of South Portland, 332 F. Supp. 3d 264, 304 
(D. Me. 2018), appeal docketed, No. 18-02118 (1st Cir. Nov. 13, 2018). 
268. Id. at 303. 
269. Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986); Portland Pipe Line Corp., 332 F. Supp. 
3d at 151 (citations omitted). 
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solutions would not be a “complete success.”270  Similar to Maine v. Taylor, 
Oakland and Salt Lake City’s ordinances legitimately “guard[] against 
imperfectly understood environmental risks”271 that the air emissions from 
coal handling and storing would impose on nearby vulnerable 
communities.272  
One of the health main concerns with ports and coal shipping is fine 
particulate matter, which the U.S. EPA, California EPA, World Health 
Organization, and federal courts have all concluded is harmful at any 
level.273  Even the American Trucking Association asserted to the Supreme 
Court that “particulate matter . . . inflict[s] a continuum of adverse health 
effects at any airborne concentration greater than zero.”274  This is 
particularly concerning in Oakland, where an independent consultant for 
the City estimated that the proposed coal terminal would result in fine 
particulate matter levels over twice the daily and yearly “threshold[s] of 
significance” for air quality set by California and the local Air District.275  
The City of Oakland further determined that adding particulate matter 
would be significant because the area was “out of attainment” with relevant 
National Ambient Air Quality Standards.276  Likewise, health advocates in 
Salt Lake City are concerned about the impacts of the Utah Inland Port277 
because, even without the Port, Salt Lake County is in “serious non-
attainment” of National Ambient Air Quality Standards for fine particulate 
matter.278  It would be clear, therefore, for a court to conclude that Salt Lake 
 
270. Maine, 477 U.S. at 138–51 (holding discriminatory laws are allowable if they 
“serve[] a legitimate local purpose” that “could not be served as well by available 
nondiscriminatory means,” even if risks are “imperfectly understood” and solution may not 
be “complete success”). 
271. Id. at 148. 
272. See Brief of Amicus Curiae for State of California, Document 170-1 at 7, 
Oakland Bulk & Oversized Terminal, LLC v. City of Oakland, 321 F. Supp. 3d 986 (N.D. 
Cal. 2018), appeal docketed, No. 18-16141 (9th Cir. June 20, 2018) (No. 3:16-cv-07014-
IV) (describing pollutants that coal handling creates, and vulnerable communities 
adjacent to the Oakland terminal); Mills, supra note 264 (describing air quality concerns 
for low-income schoolchildren near the Utah Inland Port in Salt Lake City); Stevens, 
supra note 263. 
273. Motion for Summary Judgement by Defendant, Document 145 at 15, Oakland 
Bulk & Oversized Terminal, 321 F. Supp. 3d 986 (No. 3:16-vc-07014-IV). 
274. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 475 (2001). 
275. Oakland Bulk & Oversized Terminal, LLC, 321 F. Supp. 3d at 994–95.  
276. Id. at 1004. 
277. Stevens, supra note 263 (quoting an advocate: “we just don’t have a whole lot 
of room to fully increase manufacturing and truck traffic that would potentially be generated 
from the inland port”). 
278. Emma Penrod, EPA labels Utah Air-quality Problems ‘Serious’, SALT LAKE 
TRIB. (May 3, 2017), https://perma.cc/7PJK-LADB (Salt Lake County is also in “‘marginal’ 
non-attainment” for ozone); Emma Penrod, Feds Give Utah Three Years to Bring Ozone 
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City and Oakland’s ordinances permissibly “serve[] a legitimate local 
purpose”279 concerned with air quality and public health. 
Salt Lake City and Oakland’s ordinances also arguably “could not 
be served as well by available nondiscriminatory means.”280  For Oakland, 
the City likely lacks authority to enforce the less restrictive measures 
suggested by OBOT and the district court, such as using covers or 
chemical dust suppressants on rail cars carrying coal.281  The Interstate 
Commerce Commission Termination Act may preempt directly 
regulating the rail carriers, as OBOT argued in its complaint.282  
Alternatively, the fact that the City likely would have limited recourse to 
enforce contracts between OBOT and its sub-lessees undermines OBOT’s 
suggestion that Oakland should be satisfied with its promise to require its 
sub-lessees to use covers.283 
Likewise, Salt Lake City’s prohibition on extractive industries and 
refineries in the Inland Port284 may not be achievable through lesser means 
like technical regulations, because such regulations could run into state 
preemption issues, whereas zoning regulations simply barring these 
harmful activities from particular locations would ordinarily be considered 
safe within the City’s police powers.285  In addition, the requirement in Salt 
Lake City’s ordinance that coal and crude oil handling be done in an 
enclosed building, covered rail car, or open rail car if material has been 
“sprayed with surfactant to reduce dust”286—while otherwise allowing 
 
Pollution Down to Acceptable Levels, SALT LAKE TRIB. (May 1, 2018), https://perma.cc/ 
DLU7-K93K. 
279. Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 138 (1986) (citations omitted). 
280. Id. 
281. Oakland Bulk & Oversized Terminal, LLC v. City of Oakland, 321 F. Supp. 3d 
986, 995–98 (N.D. Cal. 2018), appeal docketed, No. 18-16141 (9th Cir. June 20, 2018). 
282. Complaint, Document 1 at ¶137, Oakland Bulk & Oversized Terminal, 321 F. 
Supp. 3d 986 (No. 3:16-cv-07014-IV). Oakland’s ordinance arguably does not cross the 
ICCTA because it does not regulate rail and regulates only storing and handling of coal at 
certain facilities in the city. City of Oakland, Ordinance 13385, § 8.60.010 (July 20, 2016). 
283. Oakland Bulk & Oversized Terminal, 321 F. Supp. 3d at 996. 
284. SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH, CODE § 21A.34.150 (B)(2)(f) (Sterling Codifiers 
through June 10, 2019). 
285. See generally McCready, supra note 24 (providing an overview of cases where 
city regulation of oil and gas fracking was preempted by state technical regulations but 
where, in at least one case in New York, an outright ban prevailed over an express 
preemption statute of oil and gas regulation; further arguing that state preemption of outright 
bans on oil and gas drilling is not supported by the rationale that supports state preemption 
of technical aspects of drilling, which is based on the desire to avoid a patchwork of 
conflicting technical local regulations); see also generally infra note 298 (discussing the 
authority of Utah municipalities to regulated public health and safety under State v. 
Hutchinson). 
286. SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH, CODE ch. 21A.34.150 IP, § (E)(1)(b) (2019). 
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those materials—are already strikingly minimal.  Any less restrictive means 
would be meaningless or not “satisfactory,” as the U.S. Supreme Court put 
it in Maine v. Taylor.287  
Finally, even though Salt Lake City’s and Oakland’s ordinances do 
not address many other sources of pollution that threaten health and 
environment, courts recognize that local laws “need not strike at all 
evils.”288  “[I]mpediments to complete success . . . cannot be a ground for 
preventing a [local government] from using its best efforts to limit [an 
environmental] risk.”289  Therefore, courts would be well-reasoned if they 
were to allow Salt Lake City’s and Oakland’s ordinances to survive strict 
scrutiny under the dormant Commerce Clause. 
C. Salt Lake’s and Oakland’s Ordinances Do Not Regulate 
Extraterritorially 
Just as the court in South Portland, Maine saw “little difference 
between [South Portland’s] Ordinance and other zoning prohibitions” and 
concluded the ordinance therefore did not violate the extraterritoriality 
doctrine,290 a court should have no trouble following that same logic to 
uphold Salt Lake City’s zoning ordinance.  In fact, South Portland’s total 
prohibition on crude oil loading in a city shipyard is far more intrusive than 
Salt Lake’s ordinance, which allows coal and crude oil to be loaded and 
stored so long as it is done in an enclosed building, covered rail car, or open 
rail car sprayed with dust-controlling surfactants.291  Therefore, it should be 
even easier for a court to uphold Salt Lake’s ordinance against in 
extraterritoriality challenge.  Likewise, courts should not find Oakland’s 
coal ordinance to be an impermissible extraterritorial regulation, as it does 
not restrict the handling of coal outside of the city’s “bulk material 
facilities.”292  
As in the Tenth Circuit’s Energy & Environmental Legal Institute. v. 
Epel opinion authored by then-Judge Gorsuch, even if Salt Lake City’s or 
Oaklands’s restrictions have “ripple effects” on markets elsewhere, the 
ordinances do not “blatantly” regulate price, nor do they discriminate 
against out-of-state consumers or producers.293  And, as in South Portland, 
 
287. Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 141 (1986). 
288. Portland Pipe Line Corp. v. City of South Portland, 332 F. Supp. 3d 264, 312 
(D. Me. 2018), appeal docketed, No. 18-02118 (1st Cir. filed Nov. 13, 2018) (quoting 
Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 466).  
289. Maine, 477 U.S. at 151 (citations omitted). 
290. City of South Portland, 332 F. Supp. 3d at 297. 
291. SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH, CODE § 21A.34.150 (E) (Sterling Codifiers through 
June 10, 2019). 
292. City of Oakland, Cal., Ordinance 13385, § 8.60.040(B) (July 20, 2016).  
293. Energy & Env’t Legal Inst. v. Epel, 793 F.3d 1169, 1173–74 (10th Cir. 2015). 
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Maine, “conduct is not controlled by the Ordinance[s] if it occurs outside” 
the cities’ ports.294  Both Salt Lake City’s and Oaklands’s ordinances are 
well within the cities’ “historic police powers” described in South 
Portland.295  They are nothing more than “health and safety regulations,” 
as then-Judge Gorsuch framed it, which are well within the bounds of the 
dormant Commerce Clause.296  In fact, California’s Attorney General 
agrees that Oakland may use its “police power to protect . . . vulnerable 
residents from dangerous pollution.”297  The Utah Supreme Court has also 
long recognized the general welfare power of Utah municipalities, and that 
it would be “a mockery of the concept of local self-government to require 
all counties to have the same ordinances as all others.”298  The fact that 
Oakland’s and Salt Lake’s ordinances regulate products which come from 
or go to other states does not change the fact that they only directly regulate 
activities within the cities.299  Therefore, courts would be well-supported to 
conclude that neither Salt Lake City’s nor Oakland’s ordnance regulate 
extraterritorially. 
D. Oakland and Salt Lake’s Ordinance Do Not Infringe on 
Foreign Commerce  
Just as in South Portland, Maine, Oakland’s and Salt Lake’s 
ordinances do not interfere with the “federal government’s ability to speak 
with one voice when regulating commerce with foreign governments.”300  
The South Portland court aptly reasoned that “[a]ny local regulation or 
prohibition on a large and important industry (fossil fuels) will inevitably 
 
294. City of South Portland, 332 F. Supp. 3d at 297. 
295. Id.  
296. Energy & Env’t Legal Inst., 793 F.3d at 1174. 
297. See Brief of Amicus Curiae for State of California, Document 170-1 at 7, 
Oakland Bulk & Oversized Terminal, LLC v. City of Oakland, 321 F. Supp. 3d 986 (N.D. 
Cal. 2018) (No. 3:16-vc-07014-IV). 
298. State v. Hutchinson, 624 P.2d 1116, 1126 (Utah 1980) (holding that, because 
Utah statutorily granted the “general welfare power to local governments, those 
governments have independent authority apart from, and in addition to, specific grants of 
authority to pass ordinances which are reasonably and appropriately related to the objectives 
of that power, i.e. providing for the public safety, health, morals, and welfare” (citing Salt 
Lake City v. Allred, 437 P.2d 434 (1968))); see also DALE KRANE ET AL., HOME RULE IN 
AMERICA: A FIFTY STATE HANDBOOK 408–09 (2002) (describing how State v. Hutchinson 
established a “statutory home role” for Utah local governments). 
299. See Rocky Mt. Farmers Union, 730 F.3d 1070, 1106 (9th Cir. 2013) (“[t]he 
Commerce Clause does not protect [a business’s] ability to make others pay for the hidden 
harms of their products merely because those products are shipped across state lines”). 
300. Portland Pipe Line Corp. v. City of South Portland, 332 F. Supp. 3d 264, 313–
14 (D. Me. 2018) (citing Japan Line, Ltd. v. Los Angeles Cty., 441 U.S. 434, 449 (1979)), 
appeal docketed, No. 18-02118 (1st Cir. filed Nov. 13, 2018). 
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touch on federal commerce in a broad sense, given the realities of a modern 
globalized society,” and the mere fact that an ordinance has “‘foreign 
resonances’ because it impacts a piece of cross-border infrastructure and a 
large industry” does not put it in conflict with the Commerce Clause.301  
Likewise, the mere fact that the coal industry or other industries hope to 
ship their products to international markets via ports in Oakland and Salt 
Lake City does not mean those cities’ ordinances violate the dormant 
Commerce Clause, where they neither target any foreign countries, nor 
force market participants to comply with inconsistent burdens. 
V. Conclusion 
Utah’s coal industry got a temporary win with the Oakland district 
court decision, but municipalities have the power to win the larger fight 
over restrictions on fossil fuels at their ports.  The recent decisions in South 
Portland, Maine and Portland, Oregon demonstrate that municipal bans on 
fossil fuel shipping and handling at ports can withstand dormant Commerce 
Clause challenges. Further, these two Portland decisions, alongside 
precedent from the U.S. Supreme Court,302 the Tenth Circuit under Justice 
Gorsuch,303 and the Ninth Circuit304 suggest that Oakland’s coal ban and 
Salt Lake City’s restrictions on coal, oil, refineries, and extractive 
industries could and should withstand dormant Commerce Clause 
challenges.  This conclusion is consistent with the Supreme Court’s 
recognition that the Commerce Clause does not require communities “to sit 
idly by and wait until potentially irreversible environmental damage has 
occurred . . . before [they] act[] to avoid such consequences.”305  This is 
also consistent with scholarship calling for recognition of a legal right to 
“local self-determination”306 or “community self-governance”307 for 
environmental problems. 
 
301. City of South Portland, 332 F. Supp. 3d at 315–16. 
302. Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 148 (1986) (facially discriminatory law survived 
strict scrutiny where state sought to “guard [. . .] against imperfectly understood 
environmental risks” and there were no feasible, less restrictive means); see Exxon Corp. v. 
Governor of Md., 437 U.S. 117, 127 (1978) (upholding law prohibiting one industry from 
retail sales in-state).   
303. Energy & Env’t Legal Inst. v. Epel, 793 F.3d 1169, 1170 (10th Cir. 2015) 
(upholding Colorado renewable energy law against dormant Commerce Clause challenge, 
even though “some out-of-state coal producers . . . will lose business”). 
304. Am. Fuel & Petrochemical Mfrs. v. O’Keeffe, 903 F.3d 903 (9th Cir. 2018), 
cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 2043 (2019) (upholding Oregon’s low carbon fuel standard); see 
also Rocky Mt. Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070, 1101–04 (9th Cir. 2013) (largely 
upholding California’s low carbon fuel standard).  
305. Maine, 477 U.S. at 141. 
306. Briffault, supra note 37.  
307. Linzey and Brannen, supra note 37. 
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However, while cities such as Oakland and Salt Lake City have viable 
options to achieve their goals of avoiding harmful emissions from coal and 
oil handling in their ports without running afoul of the dormant Commerce 
Clause, it is also clear from Oakland and Portland that cities will need to 
be vigilant in their fact-finding to support their ordinances, as courts may 
apply a scrutinizing eye under administrative or contract law.308  Cities will 
also need to take precautions to ensure their ordinances do not cross the line 
of other claims frequently raised, including state preemption of municipal 
authority and federal preemption by statutes regulating trains, ports, and 
pipelines.309  If cities avoid these pitfalls, they will not be prohibited—by 
the dormant Commerce Clause or otherwise—from restricting fossil fuels 
at their ports. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
308. See supra Part II, discussing how the Oakland court held the record lacked the 
contractually required “substantial evidence” of health and safety risks, and the Portland 
court held Portland’s ordinance lacked an “adequate factual basis” because one of the city’s 
factual findings did not adequately combat countervailing evidence. 
309. See supra Part I, note 40 and accompanying text.  
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